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Abstract 
This study investigates the relationship between safety culture and adoption of innovation, 
and is intended to characterise the way they interact in an organisational environment. The 
empirical evidences for this research are accumulated from a healthcare organisation and an 
offshore organisation in Norway. The research propositions for this study are built upon a 
broad literature review of two independent topics, namely safety culture and adoption of 
innovation. Two propositions aim to identify the level of safety and the safety culture within 
the two organisations analysed. Additionally, three propositions aim to recognise important 
factors of a successful organisational innovation adoption. The research is based on 
qualitative analysis of primary data acquired through interviews with organisational members 
within the two units of analysis. The two organisations analysed are considered to be high-risk 
organisations with a continuous requirement for improvement through innovation.  
The research expresses the analytical methods and anchors the findings by establishing a 
triangulation through theoretical frameworks, data collection methods and data collection 
units. The coexisting perspectives, methods and data collection units evolve independently 
throughout the research and in the end converge to acknowledge potential relations between 
safety culture and innovation adoption. 
The empirical evidences consistently indicate that there are synergies between safety culture 
and the processes of adopting innovation; the capabilities essential for the advancement of 
safety culture are equally required for the practice of organisational innovation adoption. 
Consequently a relationship between the two phenomena is proposed. This put forward a 
request for further research on the association between safety culture and innovation adoption. 
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"Open your arms to change, but don't let go of your values." 
- Dali Lama 
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1. Introduction  
1.1. Background  
Innovation became the industrial religion of the late 20
th
 century, and this trend does only 
seem to become more popular. In virtually all industries companies talk about the importance 
of “doing” innovation, the majority actually also try to “do it”, however, not everyone truly 
succeed. Because of this innovation tends to frighten organisations; innovating is inevitably 
linked to risk. To become a company that succeeds in doing innovative changes more is 
required than to have the tangible resources needed and just to “do it”. This is not enough, and 
research has argued that innovation needs to be complemented by clear leadership and an 
organisational culture that constantly guides its members to strive for improvement through 
innovation (Nahavandi 1993, Ahmed 1998, Kotter 1998). Climates with initiative and 
psychological safety have also been recognised as essential to bring the full potential of 
innovation related change to a company (Baer and Frese 2003). This identifies complex 
associations between innovativeness, organisational culture and climates, firm performance 
and successful innovation. Organisational culture has become by the theorists the 
acknowledged mediator of the bond between transformational leadership and organisational 
innovation (Deshpandé, Farley et al. 1993, Amabile 1998, Jassawalla and Sashittal 2002). 
However, to the researcher’s knowledge organisational ability to adapt to change through 
innovation has never been discussed in the light of the culture for safety.  A safety culture is a 
subculture of the overall organisational culture. It includes many of the factors of an 
organisational culture that have been recognised to affect acceptance and ability to adopt to 
change through innovation. One example is the climate for psychological safety. This refers to 
formal and informal practises and procedures, motivating and supporting a work environment 
that is open and trustful, allowing employees to safely speak up without being rejected or 
punished (Edmondson 1999). This is one of the factors that are considered essential in an 
ideal safety culture, which also has been identified to positively affect how organisations 
adopt innovation. Therefore this research was dedicated to identify relations between safety 
culture and organisational innovation, and to discuss whether an advanced safety culture 
might positively influence an organisation’s innovation adoption process. 
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1.2. Importance of the Research 
We live in a world full of industrial challenges, with an increasing market pressure, high 
competition, lack of resources and new risk realities confronting most industries. The possible 
best and most obvious way to deal with these challenges is to make use of innovative 
solutions in form of improved processes, new technological systems and cost-reducing 
implements. One societal aspect of innovation in regard to improve industry is the potential of 
improving industry safety; reducing risk of environmental damage and human harm. High risk 
industries, such as the oil and gas industry and aviation industry, have always been concerned 
with safety. Academics claim that during the last decade the oil and gas industry has moved 
from a culture where accidents were regarded as unavoidable, to one where deaths and 
injuries are principally non-existent and personnel are safer once they enter their workplace 
than in their own home (Hudson 2003). This has followed as a result of many improvements 
in safety procedures and systems through making use of innovation, as well as a clear focus 
on improving the cultural attitudes towards risk and safety.  
However, the healthcare sector, that also can be defined as a high-risk industry in regards to  
human safety of its patients, has apparently not been able to utilise innovations as effectively 
to increase their levels of safety. The practice of medicine in Western countries still appears to 
be overly risky for patients, and the sector is generally considered to lag behind other 
industries regarding innovation. The report “To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health 
System”, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) estimates that 98,000 hospitalised Americans die 
every year as a result of human errors (Kohn 1999). This is higher than the numbers of 
fatalities caused by motor vehicle accidents, breast cancer and AIDS combined in the USA 
(Page 2004). Now, more than ever, the Western societies demand safe healthcare. There is an 
increased pressure on the sector to deliver quality, despite the lack of resources and the 
amplified needs of an ageing population facing chronic diseases. To respond to this 
apparently prohibitive situation the demand for innovation and sharing best practice of how to 
best utilise the complex new technological advances has never been greater. Other highly 
hazardous industries with advanced safety cultures, such as the oil and gas industry, have 
found ways of operating through utilising innovation that can serve as lessons for the 
healthcare sector and other industries requiring change. 
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1.3.  Research Problem and Strategy  
The utmost objective of this study was to investigate the relations between safety culture and 
innovation adoption processes within organisations. The motivation behind this inquiry 
aroused from the high focus on innovation in healthcare; the creation of a “high-tech” 
healthcare sector, and from the current discussions in the media criticising the quality of care 
within Norwegian hospitals. These topics were deliberated and reflected upon with the 
researcher’s contacts from the Healthcare Department in Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Based 
on these thoughts the researcher came up with the idea of investigating the relations between 
safety culture and innovation adoption. Two industries were chosen to be studied, one 
industry that has demonstrated to be very successful in utilising innovation to increase its 
safety levels and one industry that still has much potential for improvements, accordingly; the 
Norwegian offshore industry and the Norwegian healthcare sector. The research concept is 
illustrated in Figure 1. Through identifying factors affecting attitudes towards change and the 
modes of adopting innovative processes the objective was to define best practises that might 
offer useful implications for the industries studied as well as for other industries.  
 
      Figure 1. Research Concept 
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By investigating differences in the psychological and practical implications of innovation 
implementation and risk management between the two sectors, the aim was to explore 
whether there were possibilities for knowledge transferring between industries of how to best 
utilise innovation to  manage risk and increase safety levels. 
To investigate the above-mentioned problems, the following research question was 
formulated for this research: 
 How does the cultural attitude towards risk and safety in the Norwegian offshore 
industry and healthcare sector affect their innovation adoption processes?  
When exploring this question it was of interest to look at the differences in the safety culture 
between the two sectors studied. In order to recognise differences in culture it was of 
relevance to understand the formal risk and safety control processes, and identify the 
managements’ managerial role in the safety process. Identified differences in the safety 
management process were linked to differences in the safety culture within the two sectors. 
The research examined how management and employees’ attitudes in regard to risk and safety 
differed between the two sectors. This was compared and linked to how managers and 
personnel in the offshore and healthcare industries felt about innovative processes and new 
technology. Ultimately this suggested whether the maturity level of the safety culture did 
affect the way the organisations adapted new technology and processes. 
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2. Literature Review  
In this chapter some central definitions of safety culture and innovation adoption was clarified 
to compile a review of important literature that has been written on these two topics. Safety 
culture and the innovation adoption process were presented as two parts in this literature 
review: one “Safety and Safety Culture” section and one “Innovation Adoption” section. The 
safety and safety culture section was aimed to examine what a safety culture is, and how it 
was defined in this research study. This section also introduced the manageable factors that 
were regarded to affect a safety culture, and presented the theories chosen to measure cultural 
levels within the organisations. The Innovation Adoption section briefly defined types of 
innovation, and described how to measure innovation adoption processes within an 
organisation.  
Within the knowledge of the researcher there were no previous academic literature discussing 
the effect of a safety culture on the organisational ability to adopt innovation. Based on this it 
was assumed that the reader would not be familiar with both of these phenomena. Therefore 
the researcher made a deliberate choice of writing an extensive and descriptive literature 
review. The literature written about the research areas separately; safety culture and 
innovation adoption, were broad. Consequently not all sources were covered herein, though a 
carefully selected collection of important work were discussed, chosen based on its relevance 
in enlighten the purpose of this research.  
2.1. Safety and Safety Culture  
Researchers have known for many years that safety performance is affected by an 
organisation's socially transmitted beliefs and attitudes toward safety; the organisations safety 
culture. The safety culture of an organisation is very complex and hard to study, nevertheless 
it is possible to examine factors that make up the culture. This sections objective was to 
inform the reader of this research study’s focus when characterising and measuring safety 
culture and safety within its units of analysis. The section was separated into five parts; Safety 
Culture, How to Create an Ideal Safety Culture, Human Factors of Safety, Cultural maturity 
Model, and Safety within the Offshore Industry and Healthcare Sector. 
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2.1.1. Safety Culture 
The widely known perception of safety culture first emerged after the Chernobyl accident 
which was a catastrophic nuclear accident in the Ukraine in 1986 (Meshkati 2007). 
Weaknesses in organisational safety caused by human errors in this accident highlighted the 
potential safety risks associated with how the culture for safety is within an organisation. 
In the International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG)’s post-accident report (1988) “Summary 
Report on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident” safety culture was 
described as: "that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals 
which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the 
attention warranted by their significance" (International Safety Advisory Group 1991). A 
statement created to underline that safety culture is both attitudinal and structural, and that it 
relates both to organisations as a whole and to single individuals or groups working within a 
organisation. 
The concept was introduced to explain how the lack of knowledge and understanding of risk 
and safety by the employees and organisation contributed to the disaster. Safety culture is 
found to be one of the major prognosticators of the safety performance of an organisation 
(HealthandSafetyCommission 1993). During the years many different definitions of safety 
culture have evolved, and there is no universally accepted definition measure of a safety 
culture. One often cited author in the safety culture literature is T.R. Lee. In 1993 he 
published the definition that a safety culture is all forms of learned behaviour which “add up 
to a shared commitment to think safely, to behave safely and to believe and trust in the safety 
measures put in place by the organisation” (Lee 1993). However, in a later paper in 
collaboration with  Booth they contracted the definition to; learned behaviours to 
organisational attitudes, risk perceptions and beliefs in the necessity, practicality and 
effectiveness of controls (Booth 1995). Though definitions do vary, most literature reviews 
agree that the term refers to a set of safety related values, attitudes and assumptions that are 
shared between the members of an organisation (Guldenmund 2000). In an organisation there 
are various factors that shape how people behave and work together. Values, attitudes, beliefs, 
norms, embedded processes and unspoken assumptions are all factors important to form an 
organisational culture. When a culture has evolved it becomes a central part of how an 
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organisation works, which is stable and difficult to change even when individual employees 
move on or teams change (Woodward 2004).  
An ideal safety culture could be described as a culture where staffs and managers have a 
constant and active awareness of the potential for things to go wrong. For this to be possible 
the culture also needs to be open and fair, and encourage people to speak up about mistakes 
and potential safety issues. In organisations with a safety culture like this people are able to 
learn about what is going wrong and what could go wrong, and by this take action on the 
potential safety issues to minimise future risk (Donaldson 2002).  
Safety culture is often confused and been used interchangeably with another concept: “safety 
climate”. Safety climate is considered to be a part of the overall safety culture in an 
organisation, though it more refers to the employees shared views of the value and the 
importance of the organisation’s safety policies, procedures and practices (Anderson 2012) . 
Mearns (1999) describe the two as; climate reflecting attitudes, perceptions and beliefs while 
culture as something  more complex, reflecting values and norms and being evident in safety 
management practices. This may suggest that it might be easier to measure a climate in 
comparison to a culture. As Anderson (2012) describes it; a safety climate can be seen as the 
more temporal “state of safety” at a discrete point in time, and is the more measurable aspect 
of safety. However, there are overlapping definitions of the two concepts, and it is clear that 
researchers within the field of safety culture have not agreed on the universal differentiation 
of the two terms. By comparing nine different definitions of safety climate, and seven 
definitions of safety culture from 1980-1997 collected in the article “The Nature of safety 
culture: a review of theory and research by Guldenmund (2000), the word most often used to 
describe climate is “perceptions” (in seven of nine definitions), though also “beliefs” is 
commonly used, and “attitudes” is mentioned in one of the definitions. Safety culture, 
however, is described by more varying terms, including all of the above mentioned words, 
though also terms such as “values”, “characteristics”, “competencies”, “commitment” and 
“behaviour”. Because of this unclear differentiation of the two concepts one will have to take 
into consideration when reading this research study that when safety culture is mentioned 
hereafter it will be overlapping with the concept of safety climate. So safety culture will be 
viewed as involving perceptions and attitudes as well as the behaviour of individuals within 
an organisation.   
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2.1.2. How to Create an Ideal Safety Culture 
The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) wrote in 2004 a seven steps guide for National 
Health Service (NHS) organisations in the UK to improve their patient safety (Woodward 
2004). The first step they claimed would improve safety was “Build a safety culture.” To have 
a functioning safety culture is essential to accomplish high levels of safety within all 
industries. That employees and management are aware of potential risks, and that there is high 
focus on preventing faults and accidents from happening, are key factors for a good safety 
culture. However, building an ideal safety culture is not an easy task and there is much 
literature discussing how this could be done.  
Harvey (2002) claims that in order to create a good safety behaviour within an organisation 
the salience of safety must be taken into consideration, since this determines the importance 
of certain behaviours. Additionally he states that the trust in safety policies and managerial 
action is also essential. The International Safety Advisory Group (1991) defined two key 
measures of safety culture: (1) the framework determined by organisational policy and by 
managerial action; and (2) the response of individuals in working within and benefiting by the 
framework. They suggested that “success depends on commitment and competence, provided 
in the policy and managerial context and by individuals themselves”, meaning that attention 
to safety involves individual awareness of the importance of safety, knowledge and 
competence through training and instruction, as well as commitment, motivation, supervision, 
and responsibility.  
There is no general agreement about what factors create an ideal safety culture, however, the 
attempts to define the factors that create an ideal safety culture suggest that high levels of 
organisational safety depends upon organisational culture in general as much as it does upon 
specific consideration to health and safety matters themselves (International Safety Advisory 
Group 1991, Cox 1998, Mearns 1998). Therefore factors such as trust, communication, 
leadership involvement and satisfaction with the work environment play important roles in 
creating an ideal safety culture. 
As Woodward et al. (2004) write in the “Seven steps to patient safety” report, one should aim 
to create a culture that is open and fair. By this they mean a culture where communication and 
sharing of information comes naturally, and when incidents do happen there is a fair treatment 
of the individuals involved. The problem often seen in different industries is the opposite, 
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when incidents or near-misses happen the management is out to point fingers and blame the 
individuals responsible of the error. Such a destructive “blame culture” is strongly working 
against the safety within the organisation. To keep an open and free communication about 
safety considerations will be very difficult with a blame culture as employees will not be 
comfortable admitting their mistakes, and the organisational awareness of potential risks 
decrease. The organisations ability to acknowledge mistakes, learn from them and take action 
to prevent the same mistakes from happening again is therefore diminishing. This is why it is 
so essential to acknowledge that human errors do happen. If the organisation can learn from 
its mistakes the long term safety benefit of the organisation as a whole will be much greater 
than to depreciate the guilt on single individuals.  
To create an open and trusting environment leaders of an organisation need to express interest 
and involvement in the work environment and safety of their employees. As Woodward et al. 
(2004) write in the “Seven steps to patient safety” report, leaders need to front as a good 
example by establishing a clear and strong focus on safety. The rapport further says that 
organisations will need good systems and processes for managing risk and identify potential 
risks. These should be adapted to fit the personnel’s work environment, and a good 
communication and feedback around potential enhancements to the systems will be beneficial. 
Reporting incidents and safety issues should be promoted, and the reporting tools should be 
easily available and user friendly. The organisation should learn to share “safety lessons”, to 
allow continues improvement on safety and the safety culture, by encouraging staffs to use 
root cause analysis in order to learn how and why incidents happen, and embed lessons 
through changes to practice, processes or systems. Therefore a lot of the responsibility to 
advance a safety culture is laid upon leaders. Managing an organisation’s safety requires a 
long-term approach focused on key determinants of the safety culture. Management needs to 
commit to safety at all levels, from the first-line supervisors to the managing directors and top 
management. Leaders need to demonstrate commitment by prioritising safety. This might be 
especially important when an organisation is pressured by conflicting safety and production 
objectives. 
When investigate the relations between safety culture and the innovation adoption process it 
was essential to get a clear impression of the levels of safety culture within the two 
organisations in question. Based on the theoretical analysis it was therefore of interest for the 
purpose of this research to look at the framework determined by organisational policy; how 
the risk and safety control processes and protocols were designed within the organisations, 
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and to understand the managements’ managerial role and involvement. It was also of 
significance to assess how competence and knowledge around risk and safety were conveyed 
through training, and to consider the awareness of the importance of safety within the 
organisations. To examine how open and trusting the organisational cultures were was of 
relevance to identify the affect of safety culture on innovation adoption processes. This was 
done through looking at how the attitudes towards reporting and blame were among the 
personnel and leaders, and how the organisations learned and took action based on their 
internal experiences and ability to predict potential future issues. The impressions of the 
safety cultures were then compared and linked to how managers and employees within the 
organisations felt about innovative processes and new technology.  
2.1.3. Human Factors of Safety 
Despite preventative mechanisms and strict protocols accidents do still tragically occur. It is 
found that greatest threat to complex and potentially hazardous systems are human rather than 
technical failures. By studying a number of high-hazard and high reliability industries it has 
been indicated that human factors attributed to around 80% of all accidents (Hoyos 1995). 
This is why, when discussing safety and safety culture, it is so important to underline the 
factor of human error.  To err is human, but for many individuals, such as those who work 
with offshore operations or provide medical care, the consequences of a minor error can result 
in catastrophic and life taking events. Human factors can be moderated; though they can never 
be eliminated and managing the human risks cannot become 100% effective.  
Many people regard safety incidents as random occurrences or unpredictable events beyond 
effective control. But although chance does play a part, and human error will never be 
eliminated entirely, the majority of incidents fall into systematic and recurrent patterns. 
Different errors occur in different parts of an organisation, and have different underlying 
mechanisms. Human errors can be categorised in different ways based on their basic 
components; causal factors, timing, consequences and mitigating factors (Reason and Hobbs 
2003). Reason (1995) defines some commonly accepted distinctions between some groups of 
causal factors;  
 Execution failures (slips, trips, delays etc.) versus Planning/problem solving failures 
(rule based mistakes or knowledge based mistakes).  
 Errors (information-handling problems) versus Violations (motivational problems). 
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 Active failures (committed by those in direct contact with the product) versus Latent 
failures (arise in organisational and managerial domains and adverse effects may take 
a long time to become evident).  
Human errors committed at any level in an organisation can ultimately have significant effect 
on safety. Wrong decisions made by organisation management can create the conditions that 
can lead to human errors and violations further down in the lines. Such latent failures are 
therefore not easily identified before an accident eventually happens at another place within 
the organisation. Therefore human errors are subject of complexness and are products of a 
chain of causes from top to bottom within an organisation. Inevitably the individual 
psychological factors are the last and least manageable links of this chain. For example it is 
almost impossible to predict and control whether someone gets distracted or forgets to follow 
a safety protocol; a common factor of executional failures. Nonetheless, the surrounding 
factors leading to forgetting can be modified by increase focus on that protocol, decrease 
pressure in work environment, encourage double-checking etc. Effective human factor 
management therefore requires an understanding of the varieties of human error and the 
conditions likely to promote them so changes can be made that maximise performance rather 
than set people up to fail. 
As already mentioned all safety incidents have four basic components; causal factors, timing, 
consequences and mitigating factors. Each of these components should be considered in the 
systems approach to reduce human errors: 
1. Causal factors: these factors play a major part in any human error caused safety incident. 
Removing them can prevent or reduce the chance of a similar events happening again. 
Reason and Hobbs (2003) groups causal factors as follows: 
 Latent system conditions: These are the underlying rather than immediate factors that 
can lead to safety incidents. As described they arise in organisational and managerial 
domains and adverse effects may take a long time to become evident. They relate to 
aspects of the system in which people work. They normally have a good intent though 
create potential problems within the system. Examples of latent system factors include 
decisions on; planning capacity, designing a new work site, policy-making, 
communicating systems etc. 
 Active failures: Errors caused by ‘unsafe acts’. They are actions by frontline workers, 
and include execution failures, mistakes or violations of a process, guideline or policy. 
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Usually unpredictable errors showing instant adverse events. Often they can be 
influenced by latent system conditions and contributory factors such as stress, 
inadequate training and assessment, poor supervision or high workload.  
 Violations: When individuals deliberately or unintentionally do not follow a procedure: 
they may not be aware of the procedure; the situation dictates a deviation; it has 
become habit; the procedure has been found not to work; the procedure has been 
surpassed by a new one but it has yet to be rewritten. 
 Contributory factors: These are factors that can contribute to an incident, such as; 
language difficulties; physical limits, e.g. difficulty of hearing or seeing something; 
psychological factors; work relationships; misunderstandings, e.g. of guidelines, 
miscommunication; management style; lack of respect for less senior; quality of 
training; equipment factors; resource factors; working conditions; environmental 
factors, etc. 
2. Timing: A bad timing allowed for the causal factors to take place simultaneously with 
failures in the defences or controls system leading to an incident that would not have had 
the same consequence if it had happened before or after (Reason and Hobbs 2003).  
3. Consequences: The impact incidents have on its surroundings, ranging from no harm to 
various levels of severity: low, moderate, severe human harm or environmental damage 
(Reason and Hobbs 2003). 
4. Mitigating factors: Some factors may have mitigated or minimised a more serious 
outcome, such as chance or luck, and actions or inaction (Reason and Hobbs 2003).  
There may be more than one causal factor involved in any human error, and potential for 
incidents to happen is often connected with latent conditions combined with local conditions 
(active failures and contributory factors). Lawton (1998) also showed that accidents happen 
when unintentional errors combine with intentional acts such as rule breaking. Clearly human 
factors do not act in isolation. Human behaviour, error and violation are shaped by 
circumstances. “The likelihood of an unsafe act being committed is heavily influenced by the 
nature of the task and by the local workplace conditions” (Reason 1995). Risk is an 
unavoidable element and any situation or object can cause a dangerous situation in the hands 
of a person at the wrong time, the wrong place or with the wrong disposition towards risk.  
Though several underlying causes in form of latent failures within the organisations structure 
have to be accounted for, research focusing on human errors in the oil and gas industry has 
indicated that the lack of care and attention is reported as one of the main factors for human 
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factors caused incidents (Rundmo 1995, Rundmo, Hestad et al. 1998, Mearns, Flin et al. 
2001).  Therefore an important aspect of human factors is also the fact that every individual is 
different in its behaviour and attitudes. Every individual has a certain alignment towards risk 
and individual differences in the willingness of taking risk; personality and the tolerance of 
uncertainty, innovation and willingness to think outside the box, will influence the way people 
consider risk (McCrae 1997). A human’s focus on potential benefits compared to focusing on 
what might go wrong is dependent on personality and will ultimately decide how much risk 
individuals are willing to take (Eysenck 1992). This will be evident in the way we drive our 
cars, in our diets, in our relationships, in our careers and also in the way we behave at our 
workplace. However, risk taking is indispensable for any scientific, business or even personal 
progress and success. Individual psychological factors to human error causes therefore 
subjective risk assessments or risk perceptions. People evaluate the characteristics of hazards 
or various features of a situation differently which lead to different feelings towards levels of 
danger or safety. In addition human factors may be affected by social, cultural and political 
processes as they also play an important role in the founding of tolerance of risk and attitudes 
to safety (Mearns 1995). 
Human factors are clearly a complex and difficult factor to prevent when managing risk in 
high-risk industries, though very important to take in to consideration. General risk 
management literature has little focus on the human effect on risk and safety. Academics and 
professionals have expressed concerns about the low of focus on the human factor the risk 
management debate (Adams 1995, Hillson 2007, Cooper 2010). However, as this research 
was particularly interested in the role of humans and humans’ attitude towards handling risk 
and how they adopt innovative processes, it was an important factor that was touch upon by 
the main research question in several ways. Human factors were inevitably a part of the 
explanation to some of the differences in the safety culture as well as the levels of acceptance 
for innovation within the offshore and healthcare sector in Norway.  
2.1.4. Cultural Maturity Model 
In the literature many modes of measuring and evaluating organisational safety culture have 
been used. Some academics have measured different dimensions of  safety culture by looking 
at incident reporting; as a measure of employees’ perceptions of managerial commitment to 
safety (Zohar 2000, Mearns, Flin et al. 2001), or as an influence on safety behaviours (Clarke 
1998), or as a measure of employees’ attitudes towards safety (Rundmo 1992). Reason (1997) 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY CULTURE AND ADOPTION OF INNOVATION 
ISELIN KORNLI                                            24 
saw enthusiasm for safety information systems among personnel as a critical measure of 
safety culture. As safety culture is a complex phenomenon the inclusion of several 
components of an organisation is needed to describe a complete safety culture (Reason 1997, 
Zohar 2000, Mearns, Flin et al. 2001). Some studies have, however, tried to capture multiple 
aspects; they typically look at a few in details and acknowledge the need to research the 
remainder (Cox and Cox 1996, Mearns, Flin et al. 2001, Sorensen 2002). 
For this research, with the ultimate goal of defining potential implications for change, it was 
argued that a useful framework ought to include developmental aspects of safety culture. 
Therefor the work of Ron Westrum (Westrum 1993, Westrum 1996, Westrum 1996, Westrum 
1999, Westrum 2004) was of utmost interest. He argued that to distinguish between different 
organisational safety cultures could be done by studying how well safety-related information 
was handled in the organisation. His theory included the definition of three types of cultures 
reflecting increasing levels of advancement in the way of how they handle information flow; 
named pathological, bureaucratic and generative (see Table 1.). Hale (2000) as well as many 
other safety culture academics have accepted Westrum’s definition, and Hale stated his belief 
that for an organisation to reached a “true” safety culture it has to achieve the generative level 
of culture put forward by Westrum.  
Pathological Bureaucratic Generative 
 Information is hidden 
 Messengers are “shot” 
 Responsibilities are shirked 
 Bridging is discouraged  
 Failure is covered up  
 New ideas are actively crushed 
 Information may be ignored  
 Messengers are tolerated 
 Responsibility is compartmentalised 
 Bridging is allowed but neglected  
 Organisation is just and merciful 
 New ideas create problems 
 Information is actively sought 
 Messengers are trained 
 Responsibilities are shared 
 Bridging is rewarded 
 Failure causes inquiry 
 New ideas are welcomed 
Table 1. Westrum (1996) description of how different organisations respond to information in 
relation to safety. 
The model developed by Westrum was brought forward by Hudson (2001) who further 
developed the theory building on the three levels originally suggested by Westrum. He re-
labels the bureaucratic stage to the calculative as well as distinguishing two additional stages 
of cultural maturity; the reactive and the proactive levels. Hudson (2001) defines the stages as 
follows:  
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Pathological: Safety is a problem caused by workers. The main drivers are the business and a 
desire not to get caught by the regulator. 
Reactive: Organisations start to take safety seriously but there is only action after incidents. 
Calculative: Safety is driven by management systems, with much collection of data. Safety is 
still primarily driven by management and imposed rather than looked for by the workforce. 
Proactive: With improved performance, the unexpected is a challenge. Workforce 
involvement starts to move the initiative away from a purely top down approach. 
Generative: There is active participation at all levels. Safety is perceived to be an inherent 
part of the business. Organisations are characterised by chronic unease as a counter to 
complacency. 
By this Hudson creates the cultural maturity model (see Figure 2.), showing how increased 
levels of understanding and awareness of risk and safety in combination with an increasing 
trust and openness within organisations allows it to climb in the advancement and maturity on 
the safety culture ladder.  
 
           Figure 2. The evolutionary model of Safety Culture by Hudson (2001). 
Westrum’s and Hudson’s thinking about levels of safety culture advancement provides the 
basis for developing a framework of safety culture that takes into consideration a range of 
areas in which safety culture might manifest itself. For this particular research Hudson’s 
(2001) model was used when assessing the safety culture maturity levels of the units of 
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analysis by looking at the way the organisations handled risk and safety information, how 
open and “trusting” the cultures appeared and by how informed the organisational members at 
different levels within the organisations were about risk and safety measures; modes of 
training, leadership involvement and general perceptions of safety related issues.   
2.1.5. Safety within the Offshore Industry and 
Healthcare Sector  
The risk and safety situations within the healthcare industry and oil and gas industry are of 
course remarkably different. In the healthcare sector the safety concerns are mainly directed 
towards the public; the patients. Within the oil and gas industry there is a less apparent impact 
on the public; nevertheless it is clearly great concerns for environmental damage if unwanted 
events should take place. Therefore in the oil and gas industry a major part of the safety 
concerns are directed directly towards the employees themselves; the Piper Alpha disaster in 
1988, when 167 people died, highlighted the direct dangers to offshore workers (Cullen 1993). 
However, indirectly also the healthcare providers can be harmed by unfortunate events, as 
through guilt and the feeling of having the responsibility of taking another humans life. The 
emotional distress of healthcare providers involved in medical errors can last for a lifetime 
and the negative psychological effects can be significant (Bosk 2003). So within both 
industries the employees will be affected by any unwanted events, and maintaining safety 
should be of great concern to all personnel.    
In the early years of the oil and gas industry frequent fatal accidents were regarded as an 
expected part of the industry, though there has always been evident that the industry has taken 
their fatal accidents seriously. However, because of a strong societal pressure for increased 
environmental and occupational safety and a range of fatal accidents in the last three centuries 
there has been a considerable improvement in safety, leading to an industry that has become 
exemplary in its safety performance (Hudson 2001). After the Piper Alpha accident several 
safety requirements were recommended, including, for example, the establishment of the 
Offshore Safety Division of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and to improve the 
management of safety by the use of safety management systems (Cullen 1993). The oil and 
gas industy found that the management of safety could be combined with occupational health 
and environmental management, and this led to the implementation of integrated health, 
safety and environment management systems (HSE-MS). The industry’s success in achieving 
such high levels of safety performance was argued by Hudson (2001) to have come mainly 
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from managements’ uncompromising appliance of safety management systems (SMS); the 
systematic use of management processes to control the risk issues the industry faced. These 
systems involves to identify and assess of the risk of particular operations, the measurement 
of how those risk are should be managed, and what measures should be taken if an 
unfortunate situation should happen (Hudson 2001). By the experience gained from the many 
accidents it became evident to the offshore industry that saving money by taking risks was 
penalised too often. Accidents caused great environmental damage and societal protests, loss 
of human life and of vast amounts of money as the results. It became clear that this was not a 
tactical strategy. However, the management systems alone did not do the job to ensure safety. 
As seen in Figure 3, taken from a research paper on the implementation of safety culture in a 
multinational offshore organisation, systems could only reduce the number of accidents to a 
certain extent. They only defined the minimum common standards in form of systems, 
practices, and procedures, and it would not be enough if employees just unconsciously 
followed these. The next step towards a safe offshore industry was to create a culture within 
the organisation nurturing safety; a safety culture (see Figure 3.).  
 
Figure 3. The developmental line, culture becomes the next wave after 
systems safety (Hudson 2007). 
During the 1990’s and the early 2000 many studies were conducted on human factors topics 
within the offshore industry, and problems associated with the safety culture were identified. 
It became clear that many of the safety systems and tools within the industry were only 
creating the wanted results in organisations or groups with an advanced safety culture 
(Hudson 2007). One step taken in the direction of creating a safety culture was to promote an 
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open an honest culture by developing investigation techniques that were to be performed in a 
blame free manner to direct attention away from the individuals and towards underlying 
causes and managerial failings (Wagenaar, Hudson et al. 1990, Wagenaar, Groeneweg et al. 
1994). It became a standard within the oil and gas industry that all incidents were to be 
reported immediately to the management. Incidents were then categorised and ranked based 
on their potential damage, allowing minor or near-misses, which could have led to danger, to 
generate major responses. Such continued pressure and commitment helped to ensure a high 
focus on safety and was slowly changing attitudes from the top down within the industry. It 
might therefore be argued that the oil and gas industries can be defined as calculative reaching 
towards a proactive culture by the definition of Hudson (2001). The development of safety 
culture within the oil and gas industry, after the importance of a good culture became 
enlightened, has been a major focus area within the industry for the last century and is still a 
subject of improvement. By constantly improving their weaknesses they strive to create a 
truly proactive culture (Hudson 2003).  
When considering safety within the healthcare environment it is generally related to the safety 
of patients; patient safety. The healthcare sector has seen a similar change in the focus of 
safety. However, the healthcare sector has been accused of accept high error rates, and of not 
taking this issue as seriously as other high risk industries (Bogner 1994, Kohn 1999, Reason 
2001). The healthcare sector has always taken medical dangers seriously so the culture cannot 
be defined as pathological. Previously patient safety was regarded as the healthcare providers’ 
responsibility, and therefore seen as something management could just expected to be present. 
This way of seeing patient safety left healthcare providers with the blame for any unwanted 
events without forcing management to reflect on how surrounding conditions may affect the 
errors that took place. More recently, based on increased assessing and information on the 
frequency of unwanted events in healthcare, there has been a change in attitude towards 
safety. During the last decade this better awareness has encouraged for understanding 
incidents underlying causes. However, the sector tends to respond with repair measures 
mainly to cases of serious outcome, and systematic improvements have not really been in 
focus (Hudson 2003). The lack of systematic risk management suggests that the culture can be 
defined more as reactive, though there may be argued for the occasional calculative area. 
However, this places health care some way behind the oil and gas industry in its apparent 
cultural maturity. 
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Since the 1990’s a wave has spread internationally increasing the focus on patient safety. In 
Norway this led to healthcare improvement projects initiated through the Breakthrough Series 
Program by the Norwegian Medical Association in 1998. These efforts have been welcomed, 
but not funded, by the government. Another organisation, the National Unit for Patient Safety, 
was established in 2007, and in 2008 the first national conference on patient safety was 
organised in Oslo (Deilkås 2010). Evidently there was a rapid interest around patient safety in 
Norway based on the motion started in the international healthcare environment. This wave 
also started some governmental initiatives, such as the launch a 
reform, ”Samhandlingsreformen,” in 2009, meant to improve the coordination of patient 
services between hospitals and primary health care givers. Additionally, based on the 
experiences from Denmark and the USA, the Ministry of Health and Care Services decided to 
start a patient safety campaign “I trygge hender” (In safe hands) for Norwegian healthcare in 
the period of 2011 to 2013. The aims are to build lasting structures for patient safety, to 
improve patient safety culture in health care, and to reduce patient injuries with 20 % by the 
end of the campaign (Nasjonal-Pasientsikkerhetskampanje 2012). The government wants to 
reduce patient injuries by introducing mandatory measures in all hospitals for areas which are 
particularly susceptible to damage, such as medication errors and hospital infections. 
Throughout the campaign all health facilities in the country will be measuring patient injuries. 
Aggregated national figures indicate that about 16 % of patient who stayed at Norwegian 
hospitals in 2010 were exposed to at least one injury. If the figures are representative, this 
means that around 44 000 patients had prolonged hospital stay, and that around 4,700 died as 
a result of their injuries (Nasjonal-Pasientsikkerhetskampanje 2012). International studies 
show that it is likely that around half of such injuries are caused by preventable events and 
therefore can be prevented (The-Health-Foundation 2011). Though there has been 
advancement in the national focus on safety there is clearly still room for improvement within 
the safety of healthcare. 
2.2. Innovation Adoption  
Researchers have known for many years that acceptance of innovation is affected by an 
organisation's socially transmitted beliefs and attitudes toward novelties. An organisation’s 
innovation adoption process is a very complex phenomenon and this makes it difficult to 
study. It is nonetheless possible to examine the features of an innovation affecting the modes 
of adoption as well as the organisational factors and measures posed to affect the innovation 
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adoption process. This section will inform the reader of this research study’s focus when 
characterising and measuring innovation acceptance and adoption within its units of analysis. 
This section is separated into two parts; Definitions of Innovation; defining different types of 
innovation and outlining the scope of innovations focused upon in this research, and 
Innovation Adoption Process; discussing different modes of measuring innovation adoption 
and ultimately defining the factors of how innovation adoption will be measured within the 
units of analysis for this particular research. 
2.2.1. Definitions of Innovation  
It can be easy to assume that an organisation that is doing or creating something new is an 
innovative organisation.  Though defining innovation as creating or doing something 
differently from others is not entirely wrong, it does not capture all the traits of innovation and 
is therefore not the full definition. Innovation is an extensive concept and can be seen from a 
number of different viewpoints. Every different way of seeing innovation and conceptions of 
what the most important features are will put forward a different definition of the 
phenomenon.   
Some decades ago it was argued that to meet the requirements of being “an innovation” it was 
not enough to have the element of novelty. An innovation also had to lead to adoption of the 
change by an organisation and by the relevant environments (Knight 1967). This is a step in 
the right direction towards an explicit definition, though it is still not complete. Therefore to 
be an innovation the idea needs to be new, and be adopted by and create a change internally in 
the organisation, as well as leading to a change externally in the underlying market, sector or 
state; “the surrounding environments”. 
However, there are other aspects that need to be taken into consideration. Firstly, the 
economically viewpoint; from this perspective an innovation is mainly defined by what 
economical growth the novelty can offer (Solow 1957, Nelson 1959, Levine 1997). Secondly, 
from the psychological perspective; creativity is of particular interest, and the change it offers 
in an individual’s attitudes and actions (Nystrom 1979, Cropley 1999). Thirdly, the 
sociological viewpoint; where the focus on innovations impact on social structure and 
behaviours of our society is the most prominent (Gouldner 1957, Aiken and Alford 1970). 
During the resent years models combining these viewpoints have tried to explain the 
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involvedness of innovation (Galanakis 2006), to help prevent misinterpretations when 
defining innovation, and aid to avoid the wrong management decisions.  
Additionally to the many viewpoints innovations can also be separated in a range of different 
classes and categories. Firstly, the level of change the innovation offers and how it effects the 
existing market parts innovations into incremental or radical innovations which are disruptive 
or sustaining. Incremental innovation describes novelties that not entirely new ideas, though 
offers modifications and improvements to present idea. Such innovations normally evolves 
the existing markets and value networks by increasing the value of the product/service, 
allowing the organisations within the market to compete against each other's sustaining 
improvements, and is therefore often termed sustaining innovation (Ali 1994, Bower and 
Christensen 1995, Bosk 2003). Radical innovations, on the other hand, introduce entirely 
novel ideas or inventions. With innovations like this follows the probability for eruption of 
entirely new markets or value chains. When the creation of a new market as a result of an 
innovation, causes disruption of an existing market or value network, the innovation will be 
defined as a disruptive innovation. Though radical innovations do not necessarily turn out to 
be disruptive innovations, generally disruptive innovations are found to be radical innovations 
(Markides 2006). 
Innovations can also be categorised into different forms of innovations, such as; a new way of 
doing tings in form of processes, systems or protocols; the creation of a new product or 
service; or a new mode of organising intangible or tangible resources within an organisation.  
When innovating on the ways things are done within an organisation through creating new 
process or set of protocols, the outcome of the change is the factor affecting the market. A 
typical example of this is “lean manufacturing”. This is a process improvement that became 
prominent after the Toyota Production System started to use this strategy, hence the term 
“Toyotism” (Womack 1990, Green 2000). Such process innovations are normally made to 
increase efficiency and reduce “waste” (avoidable use of resources), and is not necessarily 
meant to improve the product directly, though often it give the benefit of cost-savings for the 
product/service provider leading to a reduced market price for the customer.  Contrasting, 
when looking at the creation of new products or services, product/service innovations, the 
novelty is unswervingly traded in the market, and the customers will benefit from the new 
technology, tool, system or service directly. The innovations involving restructuring 
intangible or tangible resources within an organisation can often be combined with a process 
innovation, and do not often change the final element for consumption. An organisational 
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structure or people innovation will instead often change the internal organisation of the 
responsibilities, teams, stakeholders or employees this can lead to a change in some processes 
though it is not a necessity. Such a change is often made to better utilise or increase the 
organisations resources, for example can intangible resources be improved by employing new 
and more qualified staffs or affect the existing employees’ qualifications, attitudes or 
behaviour through training or education.  
Additionally there are definitions of innovation in the terms of “bad” or “good”, open or 
closed, or defined by the industry it exists in. Firstly, bad or good innovations are defined by 
their ethical net value for the society. This can be a challenging task as innovations that 
initially seem as “good” might ultimately turn out to be “bad” innovations, and vice versa. 
Take biofuels as an example; the intention, to cut the usage of fossil fuel to slow down the 
carbon emission, is clearly good. However, it can be discussed if biofuel is the best solution to 
the problem. Global gasoline prices are raising and it can be assumed that farmers around the 
world will devote larger and larger portions of their output to ethanol production. With the 
already existing issues of food shortages in parts of the world today, will decreasing the 
carbon emissions on the behalf of food production give the greatest net value for the earths 
population? Clearly this is a difficult question to answer. Secondly, when considering open or 
closed innovations, a closed innovation would be a novelty typically protected by patents or 
trade secrets, and that only benefits the originator firm. The new trend is however open 
innovation that, from the mid 1980’s, became popular with the idea that; “We don't have to 
originate the research to profit from it”  (Chesbrough 2003). This brought the concept of 
selling and licensing ideas and innovations between companies, and opened for a completely 
new mode of utilising innovation to benefit the society. Thirdly, defining innovations by their 
industries and how the innovation cycles in the industries are categorised. The healthcare 
sector, for example, involves a great concern with human safety and in Norway this sector is 
not recognised by high levels of competitiveness. Maybe because of these factors it has 
generated a slow innovation cycle and is generally considered to lag behind other industries 
regarding innovation. Also in other industries concerned with human safety, such as the oil 
and gas- and the aviation industries, the innovation cycle is also considered to be slow, and 
often takes several years. The oil and gas industry is recognised as one of the most 
conservative towards new technologies. Because of the great concern towards risks for human 
and environmental safety, and that innovations often come in form of complex new 
technologies that requires extensive testing of quality before innovations are utilised, the way 
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from “idea to business” is long and challenging. In industries with high levels of competition 
such as the ICT and car industry the innovation cycles can be much shorter, so it is clearly 
that factors such as the risk and safety aspects,  innovation complexity and competition are 
among the important factors to consider when innovation is compared between different 
sectors and industries.  
As this thesis studied safety culture in relation to innovation, a naturally choice was to focus 
on assessing mainly innovations intended to increase safety levels within organisations as a 
whole. In general such innovations are process innovations in form of new information 
technologies (IT), so when discussing innovation acceptance and adoption in the following 
sections the main focus was on IT innovations within an organisational environment.  
2.2.2. Innovation Adoption Process  
To utilise innovative solutions, such as process innovations, are assumed to bring numerous of 
benefits and help organisations achieve increased safety levels, reduced costs, increased 
effectively, and gain competitive advantage. However, a considerable number of businesses 
who have implemented innovative solutions have not experienced the expected beneficial 
results. Waterson, Clegg et al. (1999) showed this in their research on several modern 
manufacturing practices in the UK. These companies had made innovative changes to their 
internal structures and processes, though not all of them succeeded in their change. The study 
demonstrated that after innovation as many as 50 to 60 % of the companies met their expected 
objectives only “moderately”, “a little”, or “not at all”. Another reseach, a study on 
implementation of the innovative systems of Business Process Reengineering in 216 USA and 
Canadian hospitals, found that the majority of hospital executives expressed that the process 
reengineering efforts only succeeded to meet the anticipated objectives scarcely to moderately 
(Ho, Chan et al. 1999). So clearly innovation is not enough to progress an organisation, other 
critical contingencies that complement the innovations are essential for a successful change. 
Several contingencies have been recognised as important for an organisational innovative 
change. Emery et al., Detert et al. and Douglas et al. identified organisational structure, 
culture, and climate as important factors inflicting the success of change (Emery, Summers et 
al. 1996, Detert, Schroeder et al. 2000, Douglas and Judge 2001).  
Organisational innovation research over several decades has generated numerous theories and 
studies on how to measure and anticipate adoption (Rogers and Shoemaker 1971, Damanpour 
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1991, Rogers 1995). As most industries in our competitive and pressured markets depends on 
high levels of safety, reduced costs and increased efficiency and quality, the introduction and 
successful adoption of new IT systems has become a essential element of organisations’ 
competitive strategy (Porter and Millar 1985, Hazen and Byrd 2012). A wide range of studies 
have been conducted on the topic (Zmud 1982, Huff and Munro 1985, Grover 1993, 
Ramamurthy and Premkumar 1995, Lai and Guynes 1997, Menachemi, Burke et al. 2004, 
Van Grembergen and De Haes 2009, Walker, Damanpour et al. 2011), and the majority of this 
literature focus on factors and innovation elements that can predict adoption behaviour. 
Innovation research within the IT field has also attempted to build theories that integrate IT 
innovation with the general innovation theories. For example is the tri-core theory of Swanson 
(1994)  adding to Draft’s (1978) dual-core theory of technical and administrative innovation 
in organisations by adding several types of IT innovations. To mathematically model 
diffusion of innovation for different types of organisational innovations is also a crucial part 
of the innovation research. In such research where the rate of adoption is plotted over time the 
general finding is the well known bell-shaped curve of Rogers (1995), (2003), showing that at 
first, the adoption rate is very low; only few members of the social system or organisation 
adopt the innovation, then after some time the rate of adoption increase sharply. When the 
peak of the bell-shaped curve is reached the number of adoptions starts to decease until the 
maximum number of adopters is reached and the diffusion is complete (see Figure 4.).  
 
Figure 4. The Diffusion of Innovation Model, a redesigned copy of Rogers’ (2003) 
original model. 
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Researchers have developed many different diffusion models presenting different forms of the 
adoption curve for different innovations. Some of the well known models for innovation 
diffusion include the Gompertz function and the Bass model, the external influence and the 
internal influence model as represented by the logistic curve model (Bass 1969, Rothman 
1974, Lai and Guynes 1997, Meade and Islam 1998, Bass 2004). Nevertheless, the possibly 
most important contributions to innovation characteristics within the field have been the work 
of academics like Rogers (1995), Rogers and Shoemaker (1971). Rogers claimed in his 
literature that diffusion is the process by which an innovation is communicated through 
certain channels over time among the members of a social system (or an organisation). The 
main elements in diffusion of innovation as described by Rogers (1983) are shown in Table 2. 
Element Definition 
Innovation An idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an individual or 
other unit of adoption. 
Communication 
channels 
The means by which messages get from one individual to another. 
Time Innovation-decision period; time required to make the decision, and 
 
Rate of adoption; the relative speed of adoption by members of a social 
system.
 
Social system A set of interrelated units that are engaged in joint problem solving to 
accomplish a common goal. 
Table 2. Elements in diffusion of innovation (Rogers 1983).  
Some features considered as important for an innovation to be adopted by an organisation is 
features that represent interactions between the innovation and its context as perceived by the 
adopting entity. Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) consider three such features as very important 
for successful adoption; compatibility, relative advantage and complexity. According to 
Rogers and Shoemaker the compatibility of an innovation is “the degree to which an 
innovation is perceived as being consistent with the existing values, past experiences, and 
needs of the receivers.” So in order for an innovation to be accepted by an organisation it 
should not inflict with the existing ideals and feelings of the adopting units. They further 
define the relative advantage as “the degree to which an innovation is perceived as being 
better than the idea it supersedes,” meaning that in order for the organisational members to 
accept the innovation they have to understand the need of the new technology or system. 
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Finally they describe complexity as “the degree to which an innovation is perceived as 
relatively difficult to understand and use”. This is underlining the importance of informing 
and training the organisational members sufficiently in order for them to feel confident in the 
use of a new system, this will also have a significant effect on their willingness to adopt the 
innovation. Tornatzky and Klein’s (1982) literature review strongly support that these three 
features are essential by showing that they consistently influence innovation adoption and/or 
implementation in a significant number of published studies. 
Rogers (1983) also underline the importance of the modes of an individual’s adoption process 
by defining five stages; awareness, persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation. 
The awareness stage is the firs time an individual hear about or is exposed to an innovation. 
At this stage the person has no information about the innovation and has not yet become 
inspired to seek more information. However, this is where the first impression is created and 
the individual subconsciously create a positive or negative expectation about the novelty. In 
the second stage, the persuasion stage, the individual gets interested to seek more information 
about the new system/technology etc. and at this stage the person can get influenced on their 
initial assumption. This stage is therefore essential for the following steps of the adoption 
process as it is here a bad first-impression can be disproved, or a good first impression can be 
supported. The individual’s perception coming out of the persuasion stage is directly affecting 
the next stage, the decision stage, and it is therefore essential for an organisation to make the 
right information available for its members to accomplish a successful adoption. During the 
decision stage individuals take the concept of change and weigh the advantages/disadvantages 
of using the innovation to decide whether to adopt or reject the innovation. However, in an 
organisational context this decision might not be up to the individual as it is normally an 
authority innovation decisions, meaning that the management has decided that the innovation 
will be implemented. Though, it is ultimately the individual’s choice whether to follow 
management instruction or to violate organisational rules. If the individual, at the decision 
stage, agrees with the managerial decision this will clearly be of great interest for the 
organisation as a whole. After the decision follows the implementation, in this stage the 
individual test the innovation and decides whether it lived up to the expectations earlier 
decided upon. At this level of adoption the individuals can find that the innovation did not live 
up to the expectations, and fall back on the decision stage, or even find that the information 
they had received was not good enough for them to utilise the innovation, and fall all the way 
back on the persuasion stage to seek more information to help them better determines the 
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usefulness of the innovation. This is why sufficient testing of the innovation’s quality and 
performance is so important, and why training employees is essential. In this way one can 
assure an effective organisational adoption where organisational members feel comfortable 
with the innovation when it is implemented and back lapsing in the adoption stages can be 
avoided. Finally, the confirmation stage is reached, and the individuals finalise the decision 
on whether to continue using the innovation. In an organisational context this might happen as 
a managerial decision determining that the system is to be continued or to be exchanged. In 
many cases this can lead to a forced acceptation of use and not a willingly adoption of the 
innovation among some organisational members. However, if all the steps of the adoption 
process are well planned and executed by management these undesired results can be 
minimised.  
For this particular research the modes of innovation adoption were viewed based on the 
factors enlighten by Rogers et al. These theories were considered as the concepts best fitted 
for this study as they were the models of most empirical validation by previous research as 
well as including important factors of individuals’ perception on innovation. In regards to the 
innovation adoption aspect, this research looked at the features of innovation in interaction 
between the innovation and its context as perceived by the adopting units in question. 
Additionally, it identified the organisational measures to promote the organisational members’ 
innovation adoption process.  
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3. Research Design  
The research design chapter was intended to lead the reader through the research process. The 
research design was created to justify the logic, structure and the principles of the research 
methodology and methods and how these relate to the research question and the propositions 
(Jupp 2006). The first segment was related back to the major research question. Here concrete 
research propositions were defined to ultimately help answering the major research question. 
The second segment deliberated on the research method used, and finally the third section 
designated the units of analysis used for this research. 
3.1. Research Direction  
As defined in the commencement of this report, the ultimate goal of this study was to 
investigate the relations between safety culture and acceptation for innovation.   
When studying this question it was of interest to look at the differences in the safety culture 
within the two sectors studied. To identify differences in culture it was relevant to look at the 
formal risk and safety control processes, and understand the managements’ managerial role in 
the safety process. Recognised differences in the safety management process were linked to 
differences in the safety culture within the two sectors. The research looked at how attitudes 
in regard to risk and safety by management and personnel differed between the two sectors. 
This was compared and linked to how managers and employees in the offshore and healthcare 
industries felt about innovative processes and new technology. Ultimately this suggested 
whether the maturity level of the safety culture does affect the way an organisation adopt new 
technology and processes.  
In the literature chapter Woodward’s et al. (2004) argue that an advanced safety culture is a 
culture that is open and fair. To point fingers and blame the individuals responsible of error is 
not considered positive when trying to advance in safety, as a destructive “blame culture” is 
strongly working against the culture towards safety within an organisation. The oil and gas 
industry has been working intensely to improve on this area, and literature claims that it has 
become a standard within the industry to utilise investigation techniques that direct attention 
away from the individuals and towards underlying causes and managerial failings. However, 
in the healthcare industry it has been a culture for giving the responsibility to the individuals 
making the mistake, and a blame culture has for long been evident, despite an increased 
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understanding of the importance of a “fair” culture. Other factors argued in the literature to be 
evident that the offshore industry has a more advanced level of safety culture compared to the 
healthcare industry is that there has become a high focus on changing safety attitudes within 
the industry, by changing leaders’ attitudes to eventually get a change in the organisational 
members’ attitudes. It has been claimed that the offshore industry has reached the borderline 
between a calculative and a proactive culture, as defined by Hudson (2003). Though the 
healthcare sector, with its lac of systematic risk management, is indicted to lag behind the 
offshore industry in its culture maturity, and has been recognised to have more of a reactive 
safety culture (Hudson 2003). The researcher therefore drew the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: “The offshore company’s safety culture is more advanced compared to safety 
culture found in the healthcare organisation.” 
As explored in the literature review researchers seem to agree upon the importance of 
management commitment to safety at all levels in order to create a “good” safety culture. To 
create an open and trusting environment leaders of an organisation need to express interest 
and involvement in the work environment and safety of their employees through training and 
instruction, as well as commitment, motivation, supervision, and responsibility. These factors 
have also been suggested to be of importance for implementation of innovation and change. 
Therefore the second proposition was proposed as follows: 
Proposition 2: “Leadership interest and involvement positively affects the safety culture and 
innovation adoption processes within the offshore and healthcare industries in Norway.” 
When looking at adoption of innovation the two industries in question were both recognised 
as generally conservative. Their innovation cycles are “slow”, as described in the literature 
chapter, mainly caused by the by the great concern towards risks for human and 
environmental safety. Though, it can be claimed that the oil and gas industry has a longer 
experience with innovation and change, and that this industry has seen greater improvements 
because of their innovative processes when compared to the healthcare sector. Based on the 
features of successful innovation adoption by Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) two of the 
features can be considered to be in favour for the oil and gas industry; the compatibility and 
the complexity. The compatibility will be easier to receive in this industry as its organisational 
members are used to continuous change and improvements, and in general have positive 
experience with change. The complexity feature is minimised because individuals are used to 
learn about new systems and to use new technology. In the healthcare sector past experience 
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might not have been only positive, and the personnel are not as advanced in the use of 
complex technologies. This was therefore translated into the following propositions: 
Proposition 3: “It is a more positive environment for innovation adoption in the offshore 
industry than what is found in the healthcare sector.” 
Proposition 4: “Innovation increases the safety levels in the offshore and healthcare sector.” 
 
3.2. Research Method 
There are several approaches that can be used to complete a research study, the major 
methods are experimental research, action research, case study, survey, archival analysis and 
history research (Yin 2003, Wilson 2010). The type of research question, the extent of control 
that the researcher has over actual behavioural events and the degree of focus on 
contemporary as opposed to historical events are three essential factors that defines the most 
suitable choice of research method for a research study according to Yin (2003). In this 
research study the question being posed was within the type of “how” questions; “How does 
the cultural attitude towards risk and safety in the Norwegian offshore industry and healthcare 
sector affect their innovation adoption processes?” In other words, it attempted to identify 
how one attitude interacts with another. 
To decide of the appropriate method of studying the research question one first had to assess 
the degree of control the researcher had over the behavioural events. In this research the 
answer to this question was hard to determine. Both safety culture and innovation adoption 
are defined by the attitudes of every single member of an organisation, though it can be 
argued that organisational leaders have some control of how their organisation’s members 
behave and think about risk and safety, and how they feel about new technologies. If they had 
no modes to affect these two behavioural events it would be worthless to study them at all, as 
any implications found would not be applicable. However, this study’s researcher’s degree of 
control to affect interaction between safety culture and innovation acceptance within the two 
companies during data collection was close to zero. In comparison to for example practical 
research experiments in a laboratory there were a low degree of control over the behavioural 
events. 
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When then looking at the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events, it 
could be argued that the topic studied was of the contemporary nature. Attitudes towards risk 
and safety has probably been existing unconsciously as long as any human culture has existed, 
however it is only during the last few decades it has become defined as the term “safety 
culture”, and has been illuminated and discussed  among researchers and within organisations. 
Innovations have also been evident since very early ages, though it was first in the 1960’s a 
greater focus on the psychology around it evaporated. Moreover, the connection between 
safety culture and the innovation adoption process has only to a small extent been explored, 
though the subjects on their own are getting an increasingly focus within the field of business 
research.  
Even though several methods of research could have been used to enlighten the research 
question, Yin (2003) states that when a contemporary set of events which the researcher has 
little or no control over is defined as a “how” the method of doing a case study can give great 
advantages. Case studies are widely used in sociology, in organisational psychology, and 
employment relations, among other fields (Cassell 2004). As this research was aiming to 
understand the experiences and attitudes of management and employees within two different 
industries the case study design was a good method to obtain empirical information. A case 
study gives powerful means to portray a business culture to outsiders, and is often chosen as a 
research design for studies that wants to make practical improvements in an industry or in the 
society. Case study evaluations, using one or more qualitative methods, have been used to 
investigate important practical and policy questions in healthcare (Keen 1995).  
Research studies can according to Wilson (2010) be described as exploratory, descriptive or 
causal. As the research of this study was not intended to necessarily establish a causal 
relationship between the two events studied it could not initially be described as a 
fundamentally causal study. Nevertheless, the research was trying to identify a cause-effect 
relationship and aimed to describe the link between two cultural attitudes, though not 
necessarily evidence a causal relationship, which did indicate that it was a casual study. 
However, there had previously been done little investigation about the correlations between 
safety culture and innovation acceptance, which was the central interest of this research study, 
this implied that the research was of an exploratory form. Though, both areas independently 
have been thoroughly studied, as presented in the theory chapter. Because of this there was a 
solid theoretical framework to base the research on, and as the ultimate aim of the study was 
not to generate future research directions, could not be identified simply as an exploratory 
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study neither. The absolute goal of this research was to form the basis of simple decision-
making by answering a “how” question to advice on implementations and knowledge transfer 
between the two sectors studied. This would indicate that the research could be determined to 
fall under the descriptive research category. However, as the research was trying to identify a 
relationship between two factors that had not been studied extensively before, and was based 
only on in-depth interviews within two organisations, the legitimacy of being conclusive 
grounded on this research alone was minor. All correlations and implications recognised 
would require further studies to allow conclusiveness and ultimately the study was leaning 
towards being exploratory. 
Therefore it was decided that an exploratory case study would be the appropriate design for 
this research in order to establish link a between the research question and the interpretations 
of any correlations found. 
Finally it was to be mentioned that, based on the fact that the relation between safety culture 
and innovation adoption was not a renowned debate within academic literature, it was 
assumed that the reader would not be familiar with both of these phenomena. Therefore the 
researcher made a deliberate choice of writing an extensive and descriptive literature review. 
3.3. Units of Analysis  
The units of analysis for this study were selected using information-oriented sampling. In 
oppose to a random selection of units to be studied, information-oriented sampling is to 
intentionally select the cases to be studied based on predefined criteria (Flyvbjerg 2006). 
When the goal of a study is to attain as much information on a given phenomenon; picking a 
random sample of units to be studied might not be the most benefiting method. Therefore it 
was of the interest of the researcher to choose “extreme cases” (see Table 3.) as they often can 
reveal more information “because they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in 
the situation studied” (Flyvbjerg 2006). As this research is more interested in understanding 
the deeper causes and the consequences behind the research question than to describe the 
symptoms of the problem and how frequently they occur it is more appropriate to select some 
few cases chosen for their validity. So to maximise the utility of information form a small 
samples the cases were selected on the basis of expectations about their information content. 
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Table 3. Strategies for the Selection of Samples and Cases (Flyvbjerg 2006). 
From the literature research on safety culture there were three industries that exceled as the 
sectors in focus within safety culture research; healthcare industry, aviation industry and 
offshore industry. When investigating literature on innovation acceptance both the healthcare 
sector and the offshore sector seemed more predominantly investigated. Additionally, DNV 
could provide more information on these two sectors compared to the aviation industry. 
Therefore as the researcher had more information and understanding of the healthcare sector 
and the offshore industry and with the limited conditions of the research it was decided that 
only those two sectors would be studied represented by one case from each sector. Therefore 
one big organisation from each sector was selected as the two research units; one hospital and 
Strategies for the Selection of Samples and Cases 
Type of Selection  Purpose 
 
A. Random selection. 
To avoid systematic biases in the sample. The sample’s size is 
decisive for generalisation 
 
1. Random sample 
To achieve a representative sample that allows for generalisation 
for the entire population. 
 
2. Stratified sample. 
To generalise for specially selected subgroups within the 
population 
 
B. Information-oriented selection 
 
To maximise the utility of information from small samples and 
single cases. Cases are selected on the basis of expectations about 
their information content. 
 
1. Extreme/deviant cases 
To obtain information on unusual cases, which can be especially 
problematic or especially good in a more closely defined sense. 
 
 
2. Maximum variation cases 
To obtain information about the significance of various 
circumstances for case process and outcome (e.g., three to four 
cases that are very different on one dimension: size, form of 
organisation, location, budget). 
 
3. Critical cases 
To achieve information that permits logical deductions of the type, 
“If this is (not) valid for this case, then it applies to all (no) cases.” 
4. Paradigmatic cases 
 
To develop a metaphor or establish a school for the domain that 
the case concerns. 
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one offshore company. If a multiple case design had been chosen, including a third or fourth 
case, it would have become an unbalanced level of insight between the cases; this could 
potentially have introduced a bias. Therefore it was a deliberate choice of the researcher to 
make an in-depth analysis of two cases instead of a shallow and unbalanced analysis of 
additional cases. To reduce the threat to reliability that a case study of only two cases 
inherently has, multiple informants from different functional areas and level of seniority form 
each case were used to collect information. Whereas the two units of analysis were the 
hospital and the offshore company, a number of different members of each organisation were 
the units of data collection.  
Even though the selected cases were not the only environments where information about the 
relation between safety culture and innovation acceptance could be very relevant, these cases 
were particularly significant cases in various aspects. They were significant because; changes 
in these industries, in form of an ever increasing demand, encourages the use of innovation 
and new technologies in order to be able to fulfil the demands; there have been many 
undesirable incidents in both sectors the last decade leading to an increased focus from the 
public on their safety levels, and ultimately increasing the focus on safety culture and risk 
management within the two industries; and finally they are both sectors which would benefit 
from industry standardisation in new systems and cultural attitudes. By selecting cases 
strategically in this manner this research could offer higher probabilities for generalisation 
when it came to the conclusions on the main research question (Flyvbjerg 2006).  
Because of the possibility of sensitive information being reviled during the data collection, 
confidentiality letters were signed by both parties to secure the anonymity of the companies 
and the informers from both cases. This was a deliberate decision made by the researcher in 
order to allow an open dialogue with the informers, to reduce any bias or secrecy and to get a 
more trustworthy dataset.  
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4. Data Collection  
This chapter was proposed to outline how preparations where done before collecting data, 
what data were gathered and eventually how it was collected. This was done to increase 
internal reliability of the data, to assure that the research and the data presented were 
measuring what they were proposed to measure and to make the result as close as possible 
with the actual real-world situation. 
4.1. Data Type and Data Collection Tools 
As of being a case study, which was analysing a contemporary phenomenon, it was possible 
to make use of both primary and secondary data to enlighten the research question. As of the 
researchers best knowledge there was no previous studies done on how safety culture might 
effect the accept for innovation, therefore collection of primary data was believed to be the 
most appropriate data to base this study on. According to Wilson (2010) collecting primary 
data aimed at a case study can best be done through; interviews, questionnaires and 
observation.  
It is argued that a major strength of the case study data collection is that it offers the 
opportunity to use diverse modes of collecting evidence (Yin 2003). Research on culture has 
previously also been done in form of questionnaires, though these does not offer the personal 
relation between the interviewer and the informant that a interview offers, also when 
discussing a subtle topic such as attitudes and behaviours are questions could easily be 
misinterpreted with the consequences of inaccurate data or questions left unanswered (Wilson 
2010). As this research was searching for behavioural and attitudinal factors, observation 
could also have been a relevant mode of collecting primary data. However, the researcher 
deliberately decided not to utilise this tool for two key reasons. Firstly, because of the 
sensitivity around attitudes in regard to safety it was likely to assume that the researcher’s 
presence would evoke a different behaviour by the observed subjects. Additionally, it was 
considered challenging to do observations within two chosen units; in the hospital this would 
contrary with the ethical lines regarding patient privacy policies, and to enter an operational 
site within the offshore company the researcher would be obligated to complete a complex 
safety course. So be cause of the limited conditions for this research observation was not 
considered the most time effective mode of collecting primary data, providing only marginal 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY CULTURE AND ADOPTION OF INNOVATION 
ISELIN KORNLI                                            46 
contribution to the study’s overall quality. As interviews are known to allow a researcher to 
gain insight into a person’s beliefs and attitudes towards particular subjects (Wilson 2010) this 
mode of collecting data was of great relevance for this research. As this research was aimed to 
understand the deeper causes and the consequences behind human attitudes and behaviour 
interviews were the collection method that eventually was considered the most applicable. 
A key advantage of interviews is the one offered by face-to-face interviews which gives the 
researcher the opportunity to examine both verbal and non-verbal communication (Wilson 
2010). In this type of interviews the conversation can also be recorded, offering a more 
accurate transcript of the information afterwards. Additionally, it offers a great flexibility 
regarding the delivery of the questions, so the questions can be asked naturally within the 
conversation making the interviewee feel that it is more a conversation than a direct 
questioning. If a question is unclear for the informer it is easy for the interviewer to notice 
that rephrasing the question is needed through non-verbal observations of the body language 
of the interviewee, and any misinterpretations of questions could also easily be clarified. As 
of the subtle topic to be discussed for this research it was therefore a deliberate decision to 
conduct interviews in a face-to-face manner as far as this was possible. 
4.2. Interview Structure and Questions Design 
The way the interviews are structured and the questions to be asked during the interviews are 
crucial to draw the line between the research question and the research answers. Therefore 
there were put a considerably amount of effort into planning for the interviews. Interviews can 
be structured in three different manners; (1) structured interviews; a predefined set of 
questions leading to short concrete answers, (2) unstructured interviews; encouraging the 
interviewee to discuss a certain topic with no pre-set questions prepared, (3) and semi-
structured interviews; the combination of both unstructured and structured, allowing the 
interviewee to elaborate on certain points and also give the interviewer the opportunity to ask 
follow-up questions regarding topics brought up by the respondent that is of interest for the 
research (Wilson 2010). As this research was studying an internal phenomenon within the 
organisations that was not beforehand entirely understood by the researcher, the flexibility of 
a semi-structured interview method was preferred. This method offered the opportunity to 
learn about sides of the research question the researcher could not have identified as essential 
before the interview. Nevertheless, it also provided the ability to guide the respondent through 
the conversation by pre-set backbone questions.  
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The design of the questions themselves is also of utmost importance. In this regard it was 
useful for the researcher understand the use of different types of questions by using Yin’s 
(2003) five-level framework; (Level 1) questions asked of specific interviewees; (Level 2) 
questions asked of the individual case; (Level 3) questions asked of the pattern of findings 
across multiple cases; (Level 4) questions asked of an entire study – for example, calling on 
information beyond the case study evidence and including other literature or published data 
that may have been reviewed; (Level 5) and finally normative questions about policy 
recommendations and conclusions, going beyond the narrow scope of study. As the researcher 
wanted to guide the interviewees to talk about the topics of interest for the research, however 
not limit them to only discuss topics that the researcher in advance believed to be the most 
important factors, all the five question types were utilised. This allowed the researcher to 
identify essential factors of interest that, based on inadequate insight to the organisations, 
could not have been identified before the interview. Additionally, it was of utmost importance 
to consider the issue of biased questions, leading interviewees to respond in the manner the 
researcher wanted to approve her preconceived assumptions. This was a difficult task, though, 
it was strongly considered during the question design process. Experienced interviewers from 
DNV assisted during this process, and the backbone questions developed were eventually 
assumed to be qualified to conduct an unbiased interview. The final generalised backbone 
questions were given in APPENDIX. The questions presented there differed from the 
questions used for each interview, as every interview was targeting the interviewee in 
question, and also additional follow-up questions evolved as underlying topics were explored 
during each interview. Therefore not all the questions were literally represented in 
APPENDIX.   
4.3. Data Collection 
The empirical sources of data for this research were the interviews conducted within the two 
units of study. As described above both face-to-face interviews and focus-group interviews 
were used to collect data. Though not considered ideal, one interview was conducted by 
sending the backbone questions through email. This was because a last-minute respondent 
was located at a different site in the country. It became evident that this mode of interviewing 
did not offer the benefits of a face-to-face interview. The possibility to engage in both verbal 
and non-verbal communication was not offered, neither the great flexibility on delivery of 
questions. In this transcript the answers were clearly shorter and some questions were left 
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unanswered, however it gave some additional information and brought in perspectives that 
benefited the research.  
The interviewees that were targeted for the research were leaders holding key positions 
connected to HSE responsibilities within the two sectors, as well as employees working with 
(or having experience from) practical applications within the two organisations. From the 
hospital the chief of quality and one of the hospital division leaders was interviewed, along 
with three nurses from different departments within the hospital. The researcher wanted the 
interviewees to work in different locations to decrease the danger of being coloured by local 
cultures and attitudes, and ensure to get a more generalizable view of the organisation as a 
whole. These interviews were all completed in a face-to-face manner between the researcher 
and one interviewee at an office within their own work site. In the offshore company three 
leaders holding key positions connected to HSE responsibilities, three employees with 
experience from working offshore, and two employees working as offshore operators were 
interviewed. All worked or had experiences from different departments and sites within the 
organisation. Two focus-group interviews were conducted in undisturbed meeting rooms at 
two different main offices in Norway. One interview including two HSE leaders and two 
employees with experience from working offshore, and the other including one leader holding 
a key position connected to HSE responsibilities, one employee with experience from 
working offshore and one current offshore operator. The last offshore operator was, as 
mentioned, interviewed by email because of time and travel considerations. The face-to-face 
interviews lasted from 40-60 minutes, and the focus-group interviews lasted for 
approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes.  
The interviews were conducted, as planned, with a backbone based on the theory presented in 
chapter 2. The backbone interviews were made to discuss certain areas assumed by the 
researcher to be of importance, and enlighten other factors of importance in order to support 
or decline the propositions presented in chapter 3. As already mentioned the questions were 
discussed and rewritten several times in cooperation with specialists within the field from 
DNV.  
All interviews were recorded so that they could be listened to, transcribed and analysed more 
thoroughly in the analysis stage. The analysis of the transcripts was the basis for the 
qualitative conclusions that follows in the next sections. As mentioned before a letter of 
confidentiality was signed with each interviewee to ensure them about their anonymity and 
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that the information given would be used for the purpose of this study only.  This was done by 
the researcher to protect the informants and allow them to speak more freely about their actual 
attitudes, beliefs and opinions. Hence, this report did not contain any information about the 
identity of the organisations studied, nor about any of the individuals interviewed, and the 
literal interview transcripts were not presented.  
4.4. Data Analysis Strategy 
The four-step process for analysis of qualitative interviews presented by Wilson (2010) was 
used to analyse the data collected; (1) transcribing data, (2) reading and generating categories, 
themes or codes, (3) interpreting the findings, (4) and finally writing the report.  
The first step was completed as soon as possible after each interview, within one week, in 
order to have the interview fresh in mind to illuminate any misinterpretations of the recorded 
data. Also the interviewees’ timing, voice tone, etc., which may provide additional 
information about their degree of certainty and the strength of their opinions was commented 
in the transcripts in order to not exclude any valuable information that could be illuminated by 
this. 
In the second step of generating categorises the transcripts were read repeatedly to identify 
answers of correlation in order to define sub-topics of interest for the research. This research 
was designed to make interviewees express their beliefs and feelings around the two topics of 
interest. Therefore the questions were intended only to explore if the researchers assumptions 
around certain subjects were of relevance to the final research question. Hence, the answers 
were not simply categorised based on a group of questions, making the job of identifying 
actual correlations in attitudes and behaviour a challenging task. The data was therefore 
broken up to two parts; one describing information identified as relevant to conclude on 
attitudes and behaviour towards risk and safety, and one unfolding the information collected 
around innovation adoption. Within each part the topics of most relevance for answering on 
the propositions were presented and discussed, as can be seen in the third and fourth steps 
which are described in the following chapter. 
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4.5. Ethical and Reliability Considerations  
The researcher intended to be an external viewer of the units of analysis and she had never 
been considerably involved in either of the two sectors in question. However, because of 
studying previous literature about the two industries before conducting the research, 
preconceptions and opinions about the units of analysis might have subconsciously appeared 
in the researcher. This was not desirable as the researcher ideally should be completely 
unbiased. According to Yin (2003), case studies are especially prone to this problem because 
the researchers must understand the issues beforehand, and therefore are required to 
investigate literature and other sources before conducting their study. However, the researcher 
of this case study had an intrinsic motivation of seeing the relation between safety culture and 
innovation adoption processes, and would therefore not benefit from advocating any supposed 
biases of either safety culture or innovation adoption within the units of analyses. In order to 
reduce the inescapable doubt from the reader, sources external to the researcher's observations 
were used for data collection and the research question was linked to the empirical evidences 
through a clear and transparent presentation ultimately linking to the conclusions throughout 
the research study. 
Ethical questions arose from the fact that the topics in focus; safety culture and acceptance of 
innovation, are psychologically difficult topics to discuss. Therefore some considerations 
concerning the psychological reaction of the interview subjects had to be mentioned. It is not 
easy for an individual to speak openly about own potential negative attitudes or behaviour 
when it comes to the safety of others. Neither is it easy to blame one’s co-workers or 
employer for violating safety measures or ignoring safety concerns. To try to minimise the 
influence of such bias a letter of confidentiality were signed with each informant from both 
units of analysis. Privacy and confidentiality of the respondents and their organisation where 
promised by researcher, and were fully respected so that absolutely no one taking part in this 
study as a respondent or contributor were exposed for the public.  
Finally it was important to mention that the sample size of this case study was limited. The 
research was conducted in two organisations of two large industries with high internal 
variance in safety culture and modes of innovation adoption. Therefore the results of this 
study alone could not be generalised to anticipate attitudes and behaviour within these or 
other organisations and industries. The result could only be representative for the subjects and 
instances studied in this particular research, and the findings may not apply to other similar 
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case studies. Additionally, as the research represented depth of information, rather than 
breadth, it could not be expected to reach rigorous conclusions or determine precise 
relationships between the two industries studied. The findings would only allow to back up or 
decline the propositions in order to theorise around whether safety culture do in fact affect 
innovation adoption processes, as well as potentially underline subjects of interest for further 
investigation. 
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5. Data Analysis and Discussion 
To investigate the relations between safety culture and innovation adoption processes within 
the offshore industry and healthcare sector in Norway the research aimed to understand and 
identify the levels of safety culture within the two units of analysis. Based on the theoretical 
review essential features to study safety culture were identified and presented under the title 
“Safety Culture and Regulations in the Hospital and the Offshore Company”; (1) how formal 
policies and regulations manage safety defined as “Safety Regulations and Control”, (2) how 
competence and knowledge about risk and safety are conveyed through training and 
management involvement defined as  “Safety Training and Leadership Involvement”, (3) and 
additional safety culture factors such as perceptions of safety and blame culture by 
organisational members, changes in safety culture during the resent years and main challenges 
to safety as perceived by the informants under the section “Safety Culture”. At the end of this 
section the findings were discussed in the light of theory and Proposition 1 and 2 were 
evaluated. 
To assess the features of innovation adoption processes in the light of safety culture the 
research limited it focus to assess process innovations in form of new information 
technologies intended to increase safety levels within the organisations. To study these 
innovations Rogers (1983) and Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) theories were utilised. 
Therefore features of importance for successful adoption (compatibility, relative advantage 
and complexity) and the managerial efforts to enhance the five stages of the innovation 
adoption process (awareness, persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation) were 
assessed. The data analysis was presented under the title “Innovation Adoption in the Hospital 
and the Offshore Company” as follows; (1) the enthusiasm and attitudes toward innovation 
among the organisational members defined as “Engagement in Innovation”, (2) important 
features with innovations and how they are implemented that affect the organisational 
adoption process defined as “Factors of Successful Implementation”, (3) and finally how risk 
and safety are affected by the implementation of new process innovations within the 
organisations defined as “Innovation’s Effect on Safety”. To sum up this section the findings 
were deliberated based on Rogers (1983) and Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) theories. In this 
discussion the aim was to approve/disapprove Proposition 2, 3 and 4.  
The structure of the data analysis and the discussion is illustrated in Table 5. 
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Safety Culture and Regulations Innovation Adoption 
- Safety Regulations and Control 
- Safety Training and Leadership Involvement 
- Safety Culture 
Discussion of Proposition: 1 and 2 
- Engagement in Innovation 
- Factors of Successful Implementation 
- Innovation’s Effect on Safety 
Discussion of Proposition: 2, 3 and 4  
Table 5. Structure of Data Analysis and Discussion 
5.1. Safety Culture and Regulations in the 
Hospital and the Offshore Company 
Researchers have known for many years that safety performance is affected by an 
organisation's socially transmitted beliefs and attitudes toward safety; the organisations safety 
culture. The safety culture of an organisation is very complex and consists of factors such as; 
the organisations framework of policies, regulations and values; leadership involvement 
through communication, training and instruction; openness, trust and awareness; and 
organisational members attitudes and behaviours. In this section the empiric data on safety 
culture and regulations from the two units of analysis were introduced. The data analysis was 
presented under three titles (1) Safety Regulations and Control, (2) Safety Training and 
Leadership Involvement, and (3) Safety Culture, see Table 5.  
Safety Culture and Regulations 
- Safety Regulations and Control 
- Safety Training and Leadership Involvement 
- Safety Culture 
Discussion of Proposition: 1 and 2 
Table 5. Structure of Data Analysis and Discussion for Safety Culture   
and Regulations 
The main goal of this section was to gain an impression of the safety culture within the two 
organisations studied. To sum up this section the findings were discussed in the light of theory, 
and Proposition 1 and 2, as defined in the Research Design chapter, were deliberated upon in 
the light of the empirical data collected. 
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5.1.1. Safety Regulations and Control  
From the literature it becomes clear that a good organisational safety culture is depending on 
the framework determined by organisational policy and by managerial action. Though just as 
important it is how the individuals working within this framework are responding to it. So 
there are a need of formal procedures, systems and routines, and these are to be followed and 
utilised in a good manner by the organisational members. To advance in safety and safety 
culture an organisation is dependent on being a learning organisation, where communication 
and sharing of information comes naturally and changes are made to respond to the 
information received. So to get an impression of the framework for safety within the 
organisations analysed it was important to investigate their internal safety measures and at 
what level they are communicating and responding to information regarding safety.  
5.1.1.1. How Safety is Ensured  
When asked about how they ensure that safety standards are met the two hospital leaders 
immediately focus on the department leaders’ responsibility in ensuring a high standard of 
patient safety at the site of service. They include that quality is also the responsibility of every 
single healthcare professional “it is in the meeting between healthcare providers and patients 
the actual quality is created and it is here the potential for unwanted happenings or a high 
quality is found.” Safety is the responsibility of leaders at all levels within the hospital; 
department leaders make sure healthcare providers do their job correctly and that they report 
if something is wrong, then division leaders along with the Committee on Quality and 
hospital quality workers have the responsibility to take action on the reported incidents to 
decide upon measures to improve the conditions that made the incident happen.  
Safety is regulated and controlled by government regulations, and supervisory authorities 
come to do revisions and controls of the hospital, and there are also annually inspections on 
the condition of technical medical equipment externally by DSB (Directorate for Civil 
Protection and Emergency Planning). Internally the quality and patient safety are controlled 
by the Committee on Quality, the Patient Selection (user representatives) and the hospital’s 
Quality Unit. When serious incidents are reported both the internal and external controllers 
can be involved in revisions and audits, depending on how severe the event is. In the case of 
incidents that did or could have led to serious damage to a patient the hospital is required to 
inform the Norwegian Knowledge Centre for the Health Services (NOKC), and in the case of 
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unexpected deaths they are obligated to also notify the Board of Health in the government as 
well as the police.  
The nurses confirm that there have been some revisions in connection to reported events, 
however they have never experienced impromptu inspections or controls. One of the nurses is 
pointing out that this probably has an effect on how they do their job “there are no overseers 
controlling whether we do the patient visits in the hallway and things like that… that might be 
the reason why the rules might not be taken so seriously, because there are no 
consequences… there are no one controlling us, notifying us or watching what we are doing.” 
They do have internal medication counts and controls of emergency protocols, also regular 
external controls of fire safety is mentioned, though no external controls of the safety culture 
have been experienced by any of the nurses.  
When the nurses are asked about how they feel the hospital management engage in patient 
safety work, they are not sure how to answer. The impression is that they believe that the 
management is doing a good job, though they are not sure of the details. One of them 
mentions the focus that has been on hygiene recently, highlighting the importance of always 
washing your hands. One of the others informs about an obligated privacy policy course that 
she and her colleagues in the department are having, though there have still not been enough 
time for all of them to have it. Though, they express that it does not feel like the management 
have fully insight in how it is to work in the patient treating departments “there is too much to 
do, things must go faster than planned, and thus at some point so there will be a difference 
between the requirements, or expectations, and what we actually are able to do.” So they do 
not feel the protocols and systems are enough adapted for the busy environment they work in.  
In the offshore company safety is also the responsibility of every employee within the 
company. Leaders have the overall responsibility for safety, on a ship this will be the captain 
and on an installation this will be the Offshore Installation Manager. However, all the 
interviewees underline that in the resent years it has become clearer that HSE is a 
responsibility of every single employee. “Safety culture is important for everyone in the 
company, and it is something that we train on a lot in the company, both on installations and 
vessels. It’s all about getting a good culture to “settle in the backbone” of every employee.” 
When planning and building new platforms and installations, there are leaders with a main 
responsibility towards ensuring quality and safety, HES leaders. They have the supervisory 
role, making sure that safety and risk is always taken in to account through the planning, 
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design and executing phases. Additionally there is a company committee from outside the 
project that controls that things are done in accordance with the requirements. If it appears 
that the project is unable to meet a requirement the HSE leaders have to contact the committee 
and they decides whether if the project can continue or has to be put on hold until the issue 
has been solved. 
The safety in the offshore sector is also regulated and controlled by government regulations. 
Petroleum Safety Authority is the regulatory authority for technical and operational safety and 
for the working environment in the offshore sector in Norway. Their regulatory role covers all 
phases of the industry, from planning and design through construction and operation to 
possible ultimate removal. They are the supervisory authorities and can come to do revisions 
and controls of the company sites. One of the HSE leaders expresses; “I feel it is the 
government of Norway that actually has pushed the work on safety within the sector. It's the 
Petroleum Safety Authority and their requirements pushing the company forward.” Some of 
the interviewees inform that the government has started to standardise some protocols in the 
sector, such as the Safety Job Analysis tool; a risk assessment tool used to identify and control 
workplace hazards with the aim of preventing harm to any human involved in operation or in 
range of potential risks. They feel that this is a step in the right direction, and that the sector 
would benefit from having more standardisations in systems and protocols. This argument 
builds on the fact that the offshore companies based on the Norwegian Continental Shelf uses 
several of the same subcontractors, meaning that the operators from the contractor firms work 
periods at different sites within different offshore companies. If then all technical systems and 
protocols were standardised they would not have to learn to use a whole new system every 
time they change working site.  
Some of the leaders with experience offshore also have the impression that not all the 
subcontractors are good enough to ensure of the quality they deliver. Though it is demanded 
and stated in the activities regulations of the Petroleum Safety Authority “they do not follow 
up, they do not have own verifications or good enough monitoring plans, and they leaves a bit 
too much of the work to ensure safety and quality on the offshore companies them selves.”  
The offshore company therefore monitor both their own employees as well as the contractors. 
These verifications can be done both by internal members and by third parties hired to do the 
controls. They measures how good leaders are at keeping control of things and implement 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY CULTURE AND ADOPTION OF INNOVATION 
ISELIN KORNLI                                            57 
management requirements, and that the staffs qualifications are good enough, how they 
follow procedures and whether they work according to the rules and regulations.  
There are also a range of other monitoring tools available, such as for safety barriers. The 
technical state of each installation and vessel is closely monitored through a management 
system that shows the real-time condition of the technical safety barriers. Every barrier is 
given a grade on their current status, to give the leaders responsible a good overview of the 
situation. This give them a good tool to help identify which systems are at any point the most 
critical for the safety so that they can easier priorities on improving the barriers that can create 
the greatest overall safety gains. Every month they have to write a short report on the situation 
at their installation in order to inform about their impression of the overall condition and how 
they are planning to obtain resources and improve any low grades found in their system.  
5.1.1.2. Report System and the Culture of Reporting  
Both sectors operate with a similar digital tool made to report errors, unfortunate events and 
near-misses that could have created dangerous situations. Employees at any level within the 
organisation can report an event. In both systems the report is sent showing the identity of the 
reporter. The reports logged in the system and sent to the leaders further up in the organisation 
that evaluates the incoming reports. If the events reported are of a certain severity degree 
there are done further investigations in form of a root cause analysis to identify the cause of 
the event, and what measures are needed to decrease the chances of the events to be recurring. 
Though, as one of the hospital leaders say “Error is a part of a human business. Parts of the 
business will be chaotic and random, and mistakes will happen no matter how you plan. But 
you can reduce the risk and reducing the likelihood of unfortunate events happening.” 
One of the main differences in the reporting protocols between the organisations is that in the 
offshore organisation all reports are required to be written in a “general manner”; meaning 
that no names should be reported and that they have to be written as descriptions of the 
situation using terms such as “operator1 and operator2”. In the hospital this is not a 
requirement. Here there are no policies around the manner of writing a report. Though, the 
hospital leaders have the impression that the reporting culture in overall is quite anonymous, 
focusing mainly on the situation and the underlying causes.  
The nurses interviewed express that they in most cases feel comfortable to report events, 
though only one of them feels that the system is anonymous enough. Her problem is mostly 
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that she does not have the time to report all incidents, and if she does not have the time to do 
it immediately it is easy to forget to do it later. The two other nurses also see the time-priority 
as one of the main issues, however, they do not agree that the system is anonymous enough. 
They have experienced situations where they or their colleges have reported mistakes of a 
named doctor, and then a copy of the message is then sent to the named persons mentioned in 
the report. Also when a nurse reports a different department’s mistakes, the report is sent to 
the department with the reporter’s name. Both of them mentions examples of cases where a 
doctor or an leader of an other department have contacted the nurse who reported and asked 
why she or he reported the event through the system when the problem could have been 
handled face to face. They believe that this is a reason why some their colleagues feels 
uncomfortable reporting certain issues. Two of the nurses also describes how there clearly is 
an underreporting when it comes to medicines within their departments. After they started to 
use a new tool for registering all medicines given to patients they have experienced a decline 
in reporting because of the time consuming process of the reporting. “There is a lot of 
underreporting in relation to medicines, and personally I do not report on this. This is just how 
it’s become.” In another department the nurse interviewed is very happy with the new system, 
and has no concern of any under reporting in her section. This difference in attitude is 
clarified by one of the hospital leaders as he explains that there have been issues with this 
system in the departments where there are high quantities of different drugs distributed to 
patients. Nevertheless, all the three nurses give the impression that they eagerly report most 
incidents that are related to time pressure or can be blamed on their work environment. One of 
the leaders also mentions this “issue” with the reporting culture; “It is evident that the reports 
are used by the nurses to point out resource shortages, or as a way complain that other 
departments does not do as their told.” Though this can be seen as an exploitation of the 
system he also sees it as positive, because then the operative departments have a structured 
arena to inform the top management about structural issues.  
The all over impression is that the reporting culture within the hospital is at a good and 
balanced level, and that important incidents are normally reported, though near-misses and 
events not leading to harm might not all ways be reported.  
In the offshore organisation the reporting culture seems to be well developed and reporting 
incidents is a matter of course for the employees at all levels through out the organisation. 
Though, the offshore operators do indicate that admitting own mistakes can be uncomfortable 
“It is always a bit uncomfortable. It never feels good to think that you may have put others at 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY CULTURE AND ADOPTION OF INNOVATION 
ISELIN KORNLI                                            59 
risk.” The impression is that they have experienced similar exploitation with “over reporting” 
as the hospital is experiencing, but that there has been a cultural change in the resent years do 
to a focus on this issue. One of the operators confirm that she only reports if something could 
have gone wrong or did go wrong, and not issues that does not offer any learning benefits for 
the organisation. There has clearly been some underreporting in past within the offshore 
company too, and a few of the interviewees have heard about events that could have caused 
dangerous situations which still were not reported. The operators inform that there has been a 
“blaming” culture before, and that it used to be much harder to admit own mistakes and 
discuss safety related issues before. However, this have improved radically the last years as 
well and that the culture has become much more open and honest; “Because of a high focus 
from management that pointing fingers is not accepted we have become much more 
comfortable admitting our mistakes in order for the organisation to learn and avoid the same 
mistakes”. Though, one of them does confirm that there are still people in the organisation 
that do give negative responds to mistakes, and that it can still be situations where people feel 
uncomfortable reporting. The culture has however become much better on their reporting and 
one of the offshore operators underlines another important argument for reporting: “People 
are willing to use of their time to report in to the system because the information they add is 
clearly utilised within the organisation through improvements and change.” So the fact that 
the employees actually see that their reports are taken seriously by the management and that 
they lead to improvements is of great importance to promote reporting. All interviewees agree 
that they would report all events or near-misses that led to or could have led to an incident.   
Finally, in both organisations the systems are intended to identify the root cause of reported 
events using systematic approach of analysing reported events. It is not meant as a tool to 
identify the responsible of the event or to “point fingers”.   
5.1.1.3. Learning and Measures  
The way the organisations do use the reports for learning is through the root cause analyses. 
There are own employees within the organisations responsible for handling and evaluating the 
reports. Reports are categorised by the degree of severity, and for events of a high ranking 
safety concerns or with learning potential, a root cause analysis is performed and a report 
written. The information of relevance found during the examination goes out to frontend 
workers though an emailing system and through department meetings. If there are potential 
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for improvements or decreasing risk, measures are made, such as change in protocols or 
routines.  
In the offshore company such reports are often studied and taken in to consideration when 
similar operations are to be prepared for. The operation leader will then bring the reports to 
the preparation meetings with the operators to see if they can learn from the mistakes made by 
others and identify measures to be done to lower the risk of them making related mistakes.  
However it seems like there is a higher barrier for the hospital to make a change to improve 
safety regulations than it is for the offshore company. In the hospital one of the nurses 
expresses that to get a change an issue has to be reported several times. Measures are made 
though it can take some time to get a certain issue in focus. One example she gives is that 
there was one issue that had been reported many times over a period of time, eventually a 
patient died because of that safety issue, first then it became a great focus on the issue and the 
requirement was changed. On the other hand one of the offshore operators interviewed feels 
that there sometimes can be a too low barrier within the company to change the requirements. 
She feels like the company sometimes makes requirements that are hard to take in to 
consideration. One example she gives is when an employee reported that he had burned his 
tongue on hot coffee the company made a requirement that the temperature on the coffee 
machines should be lowered. She believes that such measures are made only to “satisfy the 
system. People drink coffee daily at home, and we should be able to look ourselves... the best 
is that they do not nag too much, as this can cause frustration and dangerous situations. We 
work more safely when we have to consider or own safety, in stead of when someone is 
nagging about our safety all the time”. So there is a balance between too many and too few 
regulations to find the correct amount of safety measures. 
Finally, it appears that the greatest challenge for both organisations with their reporting 
systems is not to make the employees report events and near-misses, but rather to draw the 
element of learning by experience out of the system. Both systems are complex and new 
reports are sent every day. The front-end workers are using the system only for reporting and 
not making use of the learning perspective of the system. Therefore, the way it is today, the 
responsibility to make the employees learn from each others mistakes lay on the leaders alone.  
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5.1.2. Safety Training and Leadership Involvement 
As explored in the literature chapter an advanced safety culture require individual awareness 
of the importance of safety, knowledge about risk and safety issues and competence to 
minimise risk and how to respond to unwanted situations. This is gained through training and 
instruction, as well as leadership commitment, motivation and supervision. To get an 
understanding of the organisational efforts in promoting safety it was of great interest to look 
at the modes of safety training as a particular marker of management involvement in safety 
within the units of analysis. 
5.1.2.1. Safety Training  
Everyone starting to work at the hospital has to go trough the “New Employee Training”. This 
is a three days general course for all new permanent employees. Every employee is suppose to 
have this course before they start working in the hospital and receives their key card to the 
hospital and the computers. The course consists of classroom teaching, tours in the hospital, 
and e-learning courses that must be completed. The course is mostly about getting to know 
the hospital and the systems used in the hospital, and one of the nurses describes that the 
course include protocols for handling medicines, hygiene, fire routines, and evacuating. 
Additionally the new employees have a course more specified to the department they will be 
working in and their role. This course is locally adapted to teach the healthcare providers the 
routines and protocols of the department they will be working in. The nurses also have a 
period of eight weeks where they follow and observe an experienced nurse within their 
department, including going through a checklist of all the protocols and routines relevant for 
their work.  
However, two of the three nurses interviewed had not completed the New Employee Training 
before starting their work in the hospital. One of them started working in the hospital 15 years 
ago and at that time the only training she received was to follow an experienced nurse for two 
weeks. The second nurse had started to work part-time in the hospital simultaneously as 
studying to become a nurse. As a part-time worker she did not get the New Employee 
Training, and when she started as a full-time employee she already had experience from 
working in the department. In addition she started her full-time position during a very busy 
time in the summer, so her training was postponed. First one year after she started as a full-
time employee she received the New Employee Training. Nevertheless, both of the nurses 
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underlines that they have the perception that the hospital has changed their view on the 
importance of training. They believe that at the date of the interviews the hospital have a 
stricter policy on New Employee Training than before, and that now every new employee 
have to complete this course within a certain time of start working in the hospital.  
When asked about any follow up training for the hospital staffs the interviewees informed that 
there are no systematic follow up training within risk management or patient safety. The only 
training that is formally repeated is a 20 minutes fire safety e-learning course that is to be 
completed once a year. Two of the nurses have also recently taken a course in patient privacy 
policy, though this was not a formal training around the whole hospital.  
The offshore organisation clearly has a high focus on training all their employees at all levels 
through safety related programs and courses. Every employee visiting a building- or 
procurement site owned by the company is necessitated to have completed a basic safety 
course, this course also needs to be repeated every fourth year. They are also obligated to 
have a course in “Job Safety Analysis”. As mentioned above; this is a risk assessment tool 
aimed to prevent harm to humans by identifying and controlling workplace hazards. There are 
furthermore several courses in different management systems, and every time an employee 
moves from one installation to another they have to go through “the learning on the job 
program” where they are trained locally at the installation before they are allowed to start 
working, to get to know the installation and the protocols specific for that site. Though every 
different position and role has its own training requirements, and there are specified training 
matrixes that have to be followed and documented through a management system. On of the 
operators interviewed, for instance describes that she needs to complete a range of e-learning 
courses on a yearly basis. They include protocols and routines that are not used that often, to 
always keep them fresh in mind. She finds them very useful and express that once a year is a 
good interval to have these courses.  
However, there are some issues with the training programs within the offshore company as 
well. Accumulative demand of qualified operators and engineers can be a great challenge. 
Then it can be the easy way around to allow new operators to become operative too soon, 
without all the required training fulfilled. Also “the learning on the job program” where 
moved employees are trained locally at the new site might also be shorten down because the 
new staffs is needed in production. “You must follow the production plan; it's supposed to be 
followed even if there are new people coming in. However, they do not know the system at 
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the new installation well enough, and normally they are required to have some specific 
training before they becomes operational. But here the system fails a little, which then means 
that we get events.” 
5.1.3. Safety Culture   
To assess the general maturity of safety culture within the units of analysis it became relevant 
to hear their own perceptions of their organisation’s safety culture, and how open and trusting 
the organisational members feel their organisations are. Additionally it was of interest to get 
an impression of resent changes within the culture to identify the directions the organisations 
were moving in regard to safety. Finally it was of interest what challenges the organisational 
member felt influenced their safety levels and how they expected to deal whit these.  
5.1.3.1. The Perception of Safety Culture  
The Hospital’s Head of Quality underlines that there are many definitions and many words on 
this topic and that this applies a topic still not well studied and understood by the health sector. 
He defines that a good safety culture can be found in an organisation that manages to balance 
patient safety and health results with a healthy economy. “An established and successful 
safety culture will be able to make patient safety outcomes, economy and efficiency to act 
together. A safety culture fully depends on acting together with the other drivers in the 
healthcare service which are the patient outcomes, efficiency, and the economy.” 
He’s perception of how the hospital’s safety culture compares to his vision is that they are 
working determined towards this. They are on their way, though they will never become as 
good as their visions. “There will never be a time when we can lean back and say; now it is 
good enough.” Healthcare is under constant change, and change requires adaption. If there is 
one thing that describes the healthcare service it is “change”. He informs that the hospital has 
started recently started to do research on patient safety, and expect that this will help quite a 
lot in terms of their understanding of this area Patient safety is clearly one of the focus areas 
of the hospital, though as for the whole health sector in Norway it is still a development area. 
The Division Director describes a good patient safety culture as having high competence and 
well structured routines that that are followed and controlled. He points out that to have a 
good safety culture an organisation will have to learn from its mistakes, and be able to adapt 
and change the way things are done.  
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When asked about the actual safety culture of his division he defines two categories: 1. In 
work environments where you perform reparative procedures and where it is possible to plan 
what to do and when to do things it is easy to keep high standards and a good quality, “it is 
easy to achieve good routines and have a high patient safety”, 2. Though in other parts of an 
hospital this is not the case. There are departments in the hospital where seriously ill patients 
arrive in a hurry with injuries that requires procedures the medical personnel have not done 
for a long time and have not been able to plan for. It takes time to check how to do a 
procedure exactly off the book, “then we can not just stand there studying our routines into 
the night while the patient dies”. So in work environments where it is impossible to prepare 
for what you will do next, it will also be much harder to keep a good safety culture. His 
impression is that the hospital is very good at some aspects of patient safety, though some 
aspects definitely have a potential for improvements. He concludes that the level of safety 
culture in the hospital is likely to be found around the average of the levels found in 
Norwegian hospitals. 
The three nurses interviewed give the impression that they find defining a good safety culture 
challenging. The first nurse is focused on the creation of an open and learning culture with 
acceptance for human error “none of us are perfect; mistakes can help us learn to become 
better at what we do”. She also includes the importance of following policies and procedures 
to the best interest of the patients. The second nurse embrace the procedure of double-
checking every medicine given to patients, while the third nurse sees a good safety in the light 
having good patient information handling routines, a good privacy policy. They have three 
very different perceptions of what is significant for a good patient safety culture, though they 
all include important fragments of the full definition. A good patient safety culture as 
described by the nurses; an open culture where it is allowed to make mistakes and it is natural 
to admit them, a culture where it is expected to double-check each other, and were the 
organisation has the ability to learn from mistakes to become better, with personnel who 
follows good policies and procedures made to protect the patients.  
The nurses express that they feel their departments have a good safety culture regarding 
openness and following protocols in general. However, they give the impression that 
healthcare providers in general are more focused on doing their job than considering potential 
risks and safety issues in their daily work. They also expresses that in pressured times; when 
their departments have more patients than their original capacity, they are pressured on 
prioritising their time. Then more mistakes are made and the patient safety decreases. It gets 
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harder to fulfil some protocols such as the privacy policy, double-checking each other, and to 
document the medicines given. They feel that in such pressured periods they do not have the 
time to complete the routines in the system that are designed to be “safety barriers”; made to 
ensure updated patient information at all times and safe delivery of medicines.   
The perception of safety culture in the offshore company focuses on different aspects. Two of 
the operators interviewed from the offshore company describes a good safety culture as being 
drilled in the importance of understanding the task and always evaluate potential risks before 
executing. The leaders focus on compliance in their description. That decisions and protocols 
made by the top management team are followed as an obvious part of the employees’ job at 
all levels through out the company. Every task is standardised leaving nothing up to 
individual assessment. They argue that to achieve this, the company needs well thought 
through protocols shaping the structure and describing “this is how we want it to be”. Then 
the processes need to practiced and drilled until the protocols become the natural way of 
doing things.  
When queried about the actual safety culture in the operational parts of the offshore 
organisation the interviewees’ impressions is that the culture is varying from different groups 
internally in the company. It is argued that the culture of the offshore operators is very 
dependent on the attitudes of their leaders “when culture fails, it fails through the leaders”. 
Some of the HSE leaders points out that this is a focus area within the organisation; to change 
the attitudes of leaders. They all seem to see leaders influence on the safety culture as very 
important. One knows that leaders have to set a good example “as when raising children, it 
does not help to tell them to do something if you are not doing it yourself”. They give the 
impression that many and frequent changes in protocols and a wrong priority between 
production and safety have been a challenge for the safety culture within the company before. 
However, as it has been a major and clear focus on leadership and compliance within the 
organisation the last few years, they feel that there has been a great improvement in the 
attitudes around risk and safety. Today it is allowed and even supported from above to stop 
and think “Is this the way it should be, is this safe?”; the clear message is that safety always 
comes before production. Also the blaming-culture that has been seen in the company before 
has started to evaporate because of the strong focus from top management on not to “point 
fingers”, making it easier to keep an open and honest culture.  They all agree on the fact that 
the company has reached a much higher safety level and that there is a solid safety culture 
through out the organisation today. There are still things that can get better and information 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY CULTURE AND ADOPTION OF INNOVATION 
ISELIN KORNLI                                            66 
that could be clearer. In a big organisation “it takes time to incorporate new practises and get 
the new culture to work in practice… it is a fight against reluctance, ingrained habits, 
bureaucracy and disloyal leaders”, though they all feel that the company has come a long way 
and are still progressing on the matter.  
5.1.3.2. Cultural Changes within the Sectors 
In the hospital there seems to have been a cultural improvement toward safety. Clearly there 
has been a change within the hospitals focus on the importance of training employees in 
safety. Form the interview with the nurse who has worked in the hospital for over fifteen 
years, there can be seen a great improvement in the new employee training personnel receive 
when they start as to work in the hospital today compared to the training she received when 
she started. There has also been a clear change in the way the hospital utilise innovation, and 
the last decade a range of more modern technologies and systems have been implemented 
with more or less success. However the nurse does not feel that there has been a major change 
in the patient safety during the fifteen years of her employment. One of the other nurses feels 
patient safety has decreased after certain system changes have been implemented, though in 
other departments the same changes has been found to increase the safety levels according to 
an other nurse. Though, the hospitals intention is always directed towards an increased safety. 
Also in the Norwegian healthcare sector there seems to have been a change. Before hospitals 
who reported many instances and unwanted events were accused for having a bad patient 
safety, though today hospitals are praised for having a good reporting culture and reporting 
many instances and near misses. One of the hospital leaders express that they have for many 
years discussed the need to get away from the "naming, shaming and blaming" culture, to 
direct the focus away from finding the culprit and the imposing responsibility on a person, 
“we know that is not very useful, it does not lead to improvement”. Slowly the focus has 
changed towards understand the under-laying cause of human errors. He explains that errors 
can be caused by a instant of lack of resources there and then; that it was too much to do, or 
too many patients to handle, or it may be that the person did not receive the proper training 
and do not have the right skills or competence. Though he points out that; all licensed 
healthcare providers are obligated by law to inquiry advice if their own competence is not 
good enough. If they did not do this they can be charged by law for violating this duty. One is 
never blamed for asking for advice, though one can be penalised for not seeking information 
when one is unsure. So evidently there has been a slow cultural advancement, though as on of 
the leaders states “the way from knowledge through attitude changes to behavioural change 
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can be quite long.” New system implementations, hygiene campaigns and better training of 
employees makes this evident, thought there is still a way to go.   
In the Offshore company there has also been a radical change in the focus on safety. As one of 
the operators express the leaders seem to have changed their philosophy. Before the main 
focus was on production, and if a production site experienced an unwanted event that stopped 
production the focus was to get the site up and running again. Today the leaders seem to have 
seen the importance of safety, and they are supported if they choose to postpone production 
until the root cause of the event is identified and the risk is illuminated. The changes have 
evolved stepwise during the last decade. After some serious events took place in the industry 
in the beginning of the 21’Th century the industry started to get interested in the term “safety 
culture”. More and more it became clear for the organisation that not only their systems had to 
bee good, but also to the culture among the organisational members had to work in practice. 
Then the focus came upon the importance of safety training and having an open culture where 
experiences are shared internally within the organisation. Finally during the last four years 
they have started to utilise a model of leadership and compliance and this have helped to 
increase their safety levels and advance their culture to the level it is today. The clear 
management focus on the leadership and compliancy model has made the organisational 
members understand that this is a focus that is of great importance for the organisation and 
that this is not going to change. As one of the operators describes it; “now this is what we are 
focusing on in the time to come, and I believe that people therefore understand that it is 
important and take it inn in completely different way”. So through the clear focus on the 
importance of safety by management organisational members get affected and understand the 
importance of it themselves. There has also been an improvement in the focus on training; 
“We have realized that to become good at something you have to practice.” Through training 
and practicing on procedures and how to do things the leaders believe that it will become the 
natural way of doing things, and eventually it will become the way people think; it will 
become a part of their safety culture. Still they are in the process of getting this work in 
practise, and there are a focus on utilising information about experiences and safety issues 
better. Though they have come a long way there are always room for improvements.  
5.1.3.3. Organisational Challenges 
When asked about the biggest challenge to ensure patient safety within the Hospital, both of 
the leaders interviewed answers that the hospitals capacity is pressured, in form of time, space, 
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competence and personnel. One of them argues that this is caused by the supply driven forces 
within the sector. So the demand is growing faster than the ability to deliver. “We have an 
aging population and an increasing ability to offer treatment that there really are not enough 
resources for.” The resources and capacity is limited and it is therefore not possible to treat 
every patient. It is challenging to prioritise who to treat first and who has to wait until 
tomorrow though they ideally also should have been treated today. “Sometimes we have two 
or three times as many patient as normal, and then you do get a priority situation that can be 
challenging.” It becomes a matter available time, available resources; in form of personnel 
and competences, and safety. They have to do the job just “good enough”.  
The quality manager also point out the issue of over-treating patients; that patients who do not 
really need treatment receives it because the treatments are available. “American literature 
estimates that about 30% of all diagnostic procedures or treatments are unnecessary”. Here 
there is a significant potential for saving essential resources. And as an unnecessary operation 
is just as risky as a needed surgery, cutting down on avoidable treatments will also lower the 
chances of "waste" causing "harm". 
The nurses concerns are supporting the view of the leaders. They see the capacity and time as 
the greatest challenges, and confirm that during pressured times at their departments the 
patient safety levels do decrease. There is not enough time to double-checking each other, to 
observe that patients take their medicines and stay to look for adverse events, or to report 
what medicines have been given out. “We have to strictly prioritise our time, and then we are 
not always able to follow procedures down to the smallest detail.” The nurses are also focused 
on the rapid changes as an issue. One of them describes how she feels that there are constant 
changes, and that here and her colleagues then feel that the routine violations or deviations 
that happens because of sudden changes in routines and protocol are not really their fault, 
“We keep getting new tasks that we are not prepared for, and it is still required that we should 
know everything and keep the same quality on or work, and we cannot manage that”. So they 
report their mistakes to make management understand that they cannot keep changing the 
modes of working and the tasks all the time, because “then we’ll never get good in doing the 
job”.   
In the offshore company it is clearly not one obvious main challenge. The HSE leaders are 
also mentioning time as an issue, particularly within the installation building project. They 
have to follow a strict schedule and any delay to this schedule can cost enormous amounts of 
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money for the company. If a project is delayed because of an HSE issue all ships and drilling 
rigs rented for a particular time space in the schedule have to be postponed, and eventually the 
production will be deferred which will cost the company staggering amounts of money each 
day the production start is delayed. “Profitability of a project is very dependent on how fast 
the installation is ready to start production.” Safety in such projects is very highly in focus, 
though the pressured situation can lead to misjudgements and “short-cuts”.  
Another challenge mentioned by the leaders with experience from offshore operations is that 
there is an accumulative demand of qualified operators and engineers. “As the number of 
wells to be drilled only this year compared to the previous year increases quite severely, the 
number of vessels and drilling rigs that we hire are increasing with it. They must have 
qualified people and it is a challenge to find enough qualified personnel to fulfil our demands.” 
As mentioned above; the easy way around this challenge can be to allow new operators to 
become operative too soon, without all the required training fulfilled. Also when moving 
experienced employees around it is required to have local training at the new installation or 
vessel, and this might also be shorten down because the new personnel are needed in 
production.  
Another thing that seems to be a challenge is to get the contractors to adapt to the safety 
culture of the company. The contractors account for the more than 80% of the hours work in 
the company, so then it is important that they also have a good cultural attitude in order to 
keep a safe environment within the offshore company. Many of the events that do happen 
within the company are related to contractors and not to the company’s own employees. 
Clearly it is not enough that the offshore company’s own employees share the same safety 
culture, they need to get it out to the suppliers as well. “So really, the whole supplier industry 
needs to adopt our culture, we are quite dependent on that. And we do push the supplier 
industry to get further, but they still lag a bit behind on the culture aspect.” The leaders 
express that this is a challenging task, and that it would be easier if all the offshore companies 
had standardised systems and protocols. One of the operators working on a contractor vessel 
underlines that the personnel on long term contracts have a very good culture, as they learn 
the company’s systems and protocols and are experienced in their job. Though, he also agrees 
that attitudes among contractors might not always be as good as wanted; “For short contracts 
with fixed prices it probably can be very varying conditions and the safety culture might not 
be as good as desired.” 
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The operators also mention the governing documentation, protocols, as one of their biggest 
challenges, though seen from two different views. Two of them express that the protocols can 
sometimes be interpreted in different ways, that there are some overlapping protocols and that 
there are some ambiguities. However, they have seen great improvements on this matter 
during the resent years. The last operator comments that there are some protocols that are 
physically impossible to follow, current rules and protocols are not in accordance with her 
installation’s standards. “When the platforms were built, there were many things that were not 
taken into account. They were for example meant to not need maintenance, which means that 
some of the equipment is not designed to be repaired. This makes some of the regulations 
physically impossible to perform.” The operators also feel that the rapid changes in protocols 
and systems have been challenging. “We’re maybe training on one thing and then suddenly 
there is a change in the systems so you have to deal with new things. So you constantly get 
new things without managing to be adept with a system before having to move on.” However 
now there has become a clearer message about the way the company is moving and what 
should be in focus, so they all feel that their seeing an improvement regarding this issue. 
5.1.4. Discussion on Safety Culture and Regulations 
Whilst the sections above are indented to dissect the responds from the interviews to describe 
the safety culture and safety measures within the units of analysis, this section compiles their 
main highlights. As explained in the Data Collection chapter, the data analysis strategy is 
relying on theoretical propositions (Yin 2003). The technique adopted for linking data to the 
propositions is pattern matching (Yin 2003), which in this case means finding indications that 
consistently appear in the interviews to synthesise the empirical evidences in the light of the 
research Proposition 1 and 2 given in the Research Design chapter.  
Proposition 1 states that; “The offshore industry’s safety culture is more advanced compared 
to safety culture found in the healthcare sector.” In this respect, it will be of interest to 
concern Hudson’s (2001) evolutionary model of safety culture. One should be careful when 
comparing two sectors of such a different nature and work environment, however there are 
clearly some differences and similarities that can be identified from the interviews.  
Proposition 2 suggests that; “Leadership interest and involvement positively affects the safety 
culture and innovation adoption processes within the offshore and healthcare industries in 
Norway.” In this section this proposition is seen in the light of safety culture. Here the overall 
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impression of managerial involvement in safety perceptions of safety in form of policy 
framework, training and visibility were considered. 
It seems like both sectors have had a great improvement during the last decade when 
considering safety culture. It is clearly an increasing focus on the matter and both sectors have 
enhanced their modes of handling risk and safety. Both organisations have seemingly well 
functioning safety regulations and management frameworks determined by organisational 
policy. The offshore company though appears to have better management systems in place to 
monitor the safety situation. The hospital therefore seems more dependent on the 
organisational members informing on the safety situation in the different departments. Despite 
the leaders expression of continues controls of safety neither the nurses nor the offshore 
operators have experienced any impromptu inspections of how their safety culture is in regard 
to following protocols and regulations.  
In both organisations the reporting tools and the reporting culture appear to be functioning at 
an adequate level. The hospital would possibly benefit from making it clearer for employees 
that reporting is not meant to blame individuals, though to point out issues of concern to allow 
learning. However, both organisations give the impression to have managed to minimise their 
blaming cultures which is a crucial step towards creating an open and trusting organisation. 
Though both organisations are still not good enough to utilise the information they gain from 
the reports. This is the point where the organisation builds trust. When employees feel that 
management hear them and understands their needs, then they can trust in the managerial 
decisions. The offshore company has seemingly reached a bit further on this matter and 
organisational members feel that the events they report does lead to changes and 
improvements, while in the hospital the nurses feel they have to report an issue many times 
before they get a satisfactory respond and change. Though, both organisations seem to be 
more on the reactive stage when comparing to Hudson’s (2001) model. The offshore 
organisation appears to be responding with change more rapidly, though to create too many 
new protocols and safety measures may create confusion and frustration among the 
employees, and this needs to be balanced carefully.  
Awareness of potential risks and safety measures among personnel is important for an 
organisation to accomplish to create an advanced safety culture. Knowledge and 
understanding of the importance of safety is accomplished through training, guidance and 
management involvement. Both the offshore operators and the nurses seem to have close 
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relationships to their closest leaders, though they do not feel too trusting when considering top 
management. In the hospital the nurses have little or none impression of the work top 
management do to accomplish organisational safety. They are trained when they start working 
in the hospital, thought there are no formal follow up training of employees. The training they 
have received has included only inconsequential focus on safety culture related information. 
The nurses seem to have individual perceptions of what a safety culture is and what is most 
important for creating good patient safety. The offshore operators have to some extent more 
understanding of the managerial focus on safety within the organisation. Additionally they 
follow yearly training programs in safety and are often reminded on the importance of 
“thinking safety”. It does appear that the offshore company have managed to create awareness 
and focus among organisational members beyond the healthcare providers’ natural sense of 
responsibility. There is evident that the offshore organisation through training and clear 
managerial focus has positively affected the way its employees consider safety. It cannot be 
claimed that the hospital has not accomplished the same, though form the interview findings 
the researcher does not identify sufficient data suggesting this. When considering restrictions 
to safety levels the interviewees from the hospital seem more focused on the limitations; the 
reasons why it is difficult to have a good safety culture, while the interviewees from the 
offshore sector seem more focused on what can be done to improve the safety culture. 
Based on the information drawn from the empiric data it can be argued that the offshore 
company’s safety culture is more advanced compared to safety culture found in the healthcare 
organisation, which support Proposition 1. However, the differences between the two 
organisations safety culture maturity does not appear to be as distinct as the literature 
suggested. Both organisations have seen a great evolvement in their safety cultures during the 
last decade, though they have a long way to go to reach the ideal generative culture of 
Hudson’s (2001) model. Based on the data analysed in this research it can be suggested that 
the two organisations position themselves somewhere between a reactive and a calculative 
culture maturity. Though, the hospital can be argued to be closer to the reactive stage while 
the offshore company may be slightly closer to the calculative stage. In sum, the evidences are 
too weak to reach rigorous conclusions; therefore Proposition 1 cannot be proven true nor 
proven false based only on the existing research data. 
It has become evident that leadership involvement does in fact affect the organisations safety 
perceptions and proposition two can be accepted. In the offshore organisation there has been a 
clear change in managerial focus from production towards safety. Additionally there has been 
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a change in the modes of safety training. Both of these factors have evidently affected the 
organisational members’ way of considering safety. In the hospital the managerial influence 
becomes even more visible. By the lack of general safety cultures training one of the nurses is 
clearly affected by the focus area that has recently been introduced to her by management. 
The nurse, who has recently had a course in patient privacy policy, considers this factor as the 
main factor in her description of important factors of a good safety culture. The other nurses, 
who have not taken this course, focus on other areas and are not considered with the patient 
privacy policy in their description. So leadership interest and involvement in safety assurance 
does affect the perceptions organisational members have on what is considered as important 
to ensure safety. Ultimately this will have the ability to positively affect the safety culture; 
therefore according to the empirical evidences Proposition 2 in regards to safety culture is 
supported. 
5.2. Innovation Adoption in the Hospital and the 
Offshore Company 
Innovation adoption is a complex and challenging process within an organisation. For 
organisational members to successfully adopt to new technology literature claims that 
management is required take many essential factors into consideration. To study the units of 
analysis’ innovation adoption processes Rogers (1983) and Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) 
theories were utilised. Features of importance for successful adoption processes; compatibility, 
relative advantage and complexity were investigated, and the managerial efforts to enhance 
the five stages of the innovation adoption process (awareness, persuasion, decision, 
implementation, and confirmation) were assessed. The results were presented under the three 
titles; (1) Engagement in Innovation, (2) Factors of Successful Implementation, (3) 
Innovation’s Effect on Safety, see Table 6.  
Innovation Adoption 
- Engagement in Innovation 
- Factors of Successful Implementation 
- Innovation’s Effect on Safety 
Discussion of Proposition: 2, 3, 4 and 5 
       Table 6. Structure of Data Analysis for Innovation Adoption 
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At the end of this section the findings were deliberated based on Rogers (1983) and Rogers 
and Shoemaker (1971) theories and Proposition 2, 3 and 4, as defined in the Research Design 
chapter, were deliberated upon in the light of the empirical data collected. 
5.2.1. Engagement in Innovation 
For an innovation adoption process to be successful within an organisation the management 
and organisational members’ engagement and enthusiasm in the new technology is of great 
importance. How innovation decisions were made, and what factors were involved in the 
making of such decisions within the units of analysis were important to assess. To understand 
the organisations’ implementation process and whether management were engaged in this 
process to ensure that the adoption of a new system would succeed was also of great interest 
for this research. Finally, it was essential to study whether the organisational members were 
indeed positively affected by the managerial decisions and engagement, and what their 
attitudes were towards innovation and new technology.  
5.2.1.1. Innovation Decisions  
Decisions regarding implementation of new systems have up until recently been made by the 
local top management team in the hospital. Though, in recent times there has been a change in 
the regulations, so now all decisions regarding new systems to be implemented will be made 
by a regional health authority organisation.  
Generally process innovation within the health sector has the goal to improve quality, give 
better logistics, cut cost and reduce the use time and resources. Though, as one of the hospital 
leaders express; “The aim is to save money from day one, while what we actually experience 
is that we have to use more resources. Without exception. I do not think I have been involved 
in introducing one system that has actually been resource-saving.” He explains that the 
hospital has experienced to have to permanently cut their patient capacity in certain 
departments as a result of one of their latest new systems. A common problem with new 
systems for the health sector is that they get implemented before they are enough refined. 
Companies sells systems on the grounds that the hospital will save resources, and then they 
discover the many weaknesses and it turns out to be more work for the employees, so the 
hospital has to actively help further develop the system along with the producers.  
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In the offshore organisation major process innovations is an authority innovation decisions, 
meaning that the top management make the final decision regarding implementation. 
However, adjustments in governmental regulations are also involved here as increased 
requirements might result in a need to change.  
The process innovations in the last decade within the offshore company have mainly been 
done with the intent to improve safety as a result of incidents. However, such alterations 
might be argued to be made with a cost-reduction motivation as the ultimate goal, as avoiding 
hazard situations will at a long-term perspective also reduce cost. Some process innovations 
have also been done to standardise systems to make all units use the same systems, and more 
technical innovations of more tangible tools have been done because of better functionalities, 
improvements in the product or that it is hard to get hold of replacement parts for old tools. 
Also here governmental requirements might have hanged demanding a “safer” tool among 
other things. When asked about particularly IT innovations one of the leaders express that “It 
is clearly that in previous IT-projects the actual costs have exceed estimates more often than 
for other innovations. Though, now we have become very conscious, maybe almost too 
critical, and phase out to stop such projects.” He underlines that they have become much more 
cautious about the quality of technology before utilising it.  
5.2.1.2. Implementation Processes  
Both organisations seem to follow a similar pattern when introducing large process innovative 
systems. First the novelty is implemented in one section of the organisation, such as one 
offshore vessel/platform or one hospital department; the “first-user” testing, then if that is 
proved successful the innovation is tested on a grope of departments, the “multi-user” testing, 
before eventually, if the innovation has proved to be suitable and beneficial, the system is 
implemented through out the organisation. The chief of quality in the hospital underlines that 
the importance of this is so that is if the system does not work then the implementation 
process will be stopped. Additionally, in the offshore company there has become of great 
concern to conduct formal testing and qualifying of a new system be fore the implementing 
phase is even started. In this way faults and deficiencies can be identified before much 
exertion has been invested, and alternative solutions can be evaluated. Here also user-
friendliness is taken in to consideration, because in order for a system to be well utilised it has 
to be user-friendly to the operators and in the environments it is to be used. This is in less 
focus within the hospital where it appears to be an issue with the pretesting of new systems 
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before the first-user implementation begins. This causes new systems to enter the 
implementing phase before they are enough refined. One of the nurses expresses that “The 
problem is that it is IT people who make the systems, and they have never worked in the 
clinic. So they make very fine systems in theory, though they do not work in practise and are 
not adjusted to fit our work environment.” This might mean that there are too many 
weaknesses discovered during the implementing process that needs to be further developed 
and changed allowing only the major issues to be handled, and an imperfect system is 
eventually distributed around the whole organisation. When the implementation process has 
already started much money and resources have been invested in the system. This makes it 
harder to stop moving forward in the process and decline the system for a better alternative 
even though this might initially have been the plan. When asked about the implementation of 
the system in question the hospital division leader thinks that the process was generally well 
planned. Though, they had not taken into consideration the extent of additional time it would 
take to complete the daily work by using the new system. In the first months after 
implementations doctors had to work overtime and this was of course an extra cost the 
hospital had not expected. Additionally he expressed that “if the system had been more 
thoroughly tested and all the beginner faults illuminated before implementation, the process 
would have been considerably better.” This was confirmed by one of the nurses who felt that 
the system was indeed implemented before it was good enough, leading to negative attitudes 
among the organisational members.  
For the implementation of process innovations in the offshore company there is one 
designated person at every site responsible for the implementation process. That person 
follows up the progression of adoption and delegates the roles of being prime movers to some 
operators within each department. They are thoroughly drilled in the system and are to 
advocate the new system to the rest of the organisational members. This is an approach the 
hospital also has started to utilise during their resent implementations. This is a good way to 
assure that there are always resource persons available, and decrease the chances of negative 
attitudes to arise when challenges are faced within the departments.   
Finally, the maybe most important part of the implementation process is the training of 
organisational members. For the two systems focused upon in the units of analysis the training 
of organisational members seem considerable similar within the two organisations. Both have 
arranged three days courses of training and practise for their employees in how to use the new 
systems. As seen in Rogers’ (1983) five step innovation adoption process, it is essential that 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY CULTURE AND ADOPTION OF INNOVATION 
ISELIN KORNLI                                            77 
organisational members are well trained and have a good understanding of the new 
technology to accept the new system. One of the offshore operators confirms this; “The 
problem with all new systems that are implemented is that people need the time to get to 
know them, they need the competence to use it.” In the offshore company it was additionally 
mentioned that during the training there was greatly focused upon the risk and safety related 
issues and why the system was needed. This made the users understand the importance and 
value of the system to increase their acceptance of the new tool.  The information and training 
employees receive within the offshore company seem to be sufficient in doing this, and the 
offshore operators give the impression that they feel confident in the use of new systems after 
the courses they are offered. However they indicate that information about minor system 
changes could have been better, and that they often do not receive information about such 
changes before they are receiving the actual training. The nurses do also have the impression 
that the training they received was good, though focusing mainly on how and when to use the 
system. One of the nurses comments on this, she whish that there had been more information 
about why they were to utilise the new system. She felt that it was a decision pushed upon 
them with out information about the reason why or what added value it could offer. She 
claims that this could have helped the healthcare providers accept the change. One of the 
other nurses comments that the courses were completed too long before the system actually 
was implemented, which made it hard to recall how the system worked. The nurses give very 
contradicting descriptions of the implementation process and functionalities of the system 
upon questioning. Two of them found the implementation process to be very challenging and 
still find the system difficult to use and not very effective. They are missing certain features 
within the system, and feel that they have lost the overview after they started to use the new 
system. Neither of them feels that the system has become well integrated in their work 
environment, and that the system is still an issue of concern regarding patient safety.  The 
third nurse is located in the department that was the first-user implementation group. This 
department was offered extra support during implementation process, with additional training 
and guidance, as explained by the quality manager. This nurse has a very different impression 
of the system. She express that it indeed has all the features that the other nurses are missing 
and that using the new system has given here a better overview of the situation. This might 
indicate that the training of the multi-user departments has maybe not been sufficient, and that 
it would have been beneficial for the organisation to give all the departments the extra support 
that the firs-user departments received. However, as the division leader explained, the 
implementation process was planned in a manner that the departments who were considered 
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to face the least challenges with the new system, based on their local environment, were to be 
the first-users. “… and despite some minor issues the implementation was very successful 
here. Later on in the process, though, when the departments that were assumed to face more 
complications during implementation started to use the system, it became very challenging. 
We had to permanently reduce the patient capacity in some of those departments.”  
5.2.1.3. Employee attitudes 
The offshore operators give the impression to be affected by whether the new system after 
their perception offers a relative advantage or not. They seem more enthusiastic about 
tangible innovations in form of new tools than what they seem for process innovations. One 
of them mentions a process innovation she felt was “something already existing with a new 
name”. However the new system was implemented after an unwanted event had happened and 
therefore she supported the implementation. When mentioning another process innovation, 
where she saw an obvious need for the new system, she seemed much more enthusiastic. The 
offshore operators express that there are a lot of change in their organisation. This has made 
them use to change, and expecting to have to learn new systems, so they are never surprised 
by the innovations. Though, they do that there can be too rapid changes, and that at the point 
when they feel confident and good at utilising one system a new one comes along to replace it. 
However, when the operators were asked about the particular process innovation in question 
some of them admit that they were very sceptical to the new system in the beginning. They 
explain that this was because of previous negative experience with similar systems. “We were 
sceptical before we got to see it and test it for our selves.”, but the attitude changed once they 
saw the value and at this time they are very positive to the system. “This time I believe we 
have succeeded”, though, they do still see potential for improvements in the system, but it is 
under continues improvement; “As it is with all new systems”. They give an impression that 
they consistently use the systems provided as required, even though some requirements might 
causes a short job to take considerable more time or even be delayed. One of the leaders 
express that in general the company is very excited about new technology, to increase 
competitive advantages, increase revenue, solve issues, increase safety levels, and get better 
results all over. He claims that the company is one of the market leaders within this field, and 
that they are good at inspiring others. They invests a lot in research in to new technology; 
“We are proud to develop and utilise new technology in this company”.  
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When considering the system implemented in the hospital the chief of quality admit that 
“Clearly the system was not good enough IT-technically to be greeted by the organisational 
members at the time it was implemented.” Though, he express that the pilot department that 
received extra support during the implementation process quickly got very enthusiastic about 
it and gave the impression that this was something they wanted to continue with. This is 
supported by the nurse interviewed from this department. She in general seems to be more 
enthusiastic about new technology, compared to the other two nurses who had a worse 
experience with the implementation of the new system. This can be because of the previous 
positive experience of the first nurse, though it has to be taken in to consideration that she is a 
bit younger than the others as well as she had worked at the hospital considerably shorter 
before the new system was implemented. The department leader claims that healthcare 
providers in general is not very interested or engaged in new technology before it actually gets 
implemented. They are mostly engaged in their existing work environment and have little 
time or interest of being involved in discussions years up front. “It is first the day they meet 
the new system in their department they get engaged in whether it is good or bad.” He feels 
they are neutral to innovation, and not very enthusiastic in any direction. However, he express 
that parts of management and employees have become sceptical about system innovations, 
caused by bad experiences, that few new systems actually can offer the resource saving 
promised.  
5.2.2. Factors of Successful Implementation 
All the interviewees were asked about what factors they believe are important in order for the 
organisational members to adopt an innovation. The offshore leaders enlighten the importance 
of the quality of the innovation; that the system needs to be thoroughly tested and qualified 
before it gets implemented to make sure that it function as expected by the employees, to not 
create a negative attitude for the innovation and loose the trust of organisational members 
regarding future new systems. One of the HMS leaders express the importance of a positive 
and clear message from the leaders to advocate the benefits and value of the novelty, “that 
users feel that they get something back from all the time and effort they put in to learning to 
use a new tool”. When organisational members recognise the benefits with a new system it 
creates a positive attitude towards the system among them and they do actually want to utilise 
it. If one group of employees starts to express negativity about a tool this spreads very fast 
and is a great hinder during the adoption process. The offshore operators confirm what is 
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expressed by their leaders when a safety process innovation is discussed; “when we see the 
value of the system, that it actually do what it was promised to do, to increase the safety levels, 
then we will actually also use the underlying systems; the maintenance and management 
systems, and report safety issues in a good manner.” So implementing one good system that 
increases the focus on the importance of safety might actually be motivational for the 
operators to utilise other safety systems better as well. So clearly it is an important factor that 
they see the value and need for the new tool. They also express the importance of positive 
leaders and good training and information; that they get the time to really understand the new 
system and to feel confident in using it when you are to start to use it in their job. Finally one 
of the operators adds that; “to increase safety levels is of course motivating for all of us”, so 
systems that make their job easier and safer are great motivators to positively affect the 
innovation adoption process.  
The hospital leaders agree in that the quality of the new tool is a fundamental requirement for 
organisational members to adopt it in a good way. That the system is considered as good and 
offers added value so that the users think “aha, this was smart”. They have also a focus on the 
importance of trust; that the employees feel assured that management has thoroughly thought 
through the risks of implementing a new system. That there is an implementation strategy that 
does not lead to increased risk and safety issues. Though one of them does admit that; “we 
have seen time after time that there is great risk involved in implementing new IT-systems”. 
This has led to bad experiences among organisational members, and decreased internal trust. 
“If you see a new system and feel that you, and not the system, is the expert than that will 
negatively affect your attitudes towards this system as well as towards future new systems”. 
So if a user experience obvious faults or defects once they are presented to a system, this will 
lead to bad impression and will not be beneficial for the innovation adoption process of the 
organisation. Then in the meeting with innovations later on in the organisation the users’ 
expectations are reduced, and this can affect these adoption processes as well. One of the 
hospital leaders add that standardisation of IT-systems within the Norwegian healthcare sector 
could be beneficial, however almost all systems differ from hospital to hospital and even 
internally between hospital departments. This is an issue that has been found in the offshore 
industry also, though there has during the last years been an increased standardisation and 
improvement in this field.  
The nurses see the most important factors of successful adoption to be how user-friendly the 
system is and that they receive good training and information of how to use it. The user-
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friendliness is very important to them, as no matter how good the system is, or how many 
added values it gives it do not help if they do not manage to use it in the right manner. They 
are also very focused upon the extra time required to use a new system. It seems important to 
them that systems should not bee too time consuming to utilise as this will lead to decreased 
use. As time is already pressured in their work environment systems that require extra time is 
not very appreciated. Regarding the training one of the nurses points out how essential it is 
that personnel are trained by individuals who are enthusiastic and positive towards the new 
system. The trainers also need to be very good at utilising the system so that they do not 
experience challenges that cannot be solved during training. These two factors increase the 
positivity among employees she claims. She also mention how easily negative attitudes spread 
among organisational members. She has experienced that negative attitudes from the 
departments that are not pleased with a new system affect the attitudes of departments who 
still does not use that system, and make them not want to have the system implemented in 
their department at all. Therefore, clearly to keep organisational members positive to a new 
system is an essential factor for a successful organisational innovation adoption process.  
5.2.3. Innovations’ Effect on Safety  
In the hospital innovation tends to have an initial negative effect on safety. Both the leaders 
and the nurses seem to agree on this point. “Most new systems give a quality rise in the long 
term, though rarely at once” one of the hospital leaders claims. It is not clear if the new 
system in question has had any effect on the safety of the hospital, “Strictly speaking there are 
no ways to measure an increased safety, though the conjecture is that it does contribute”. 
Though, it becomes clear that the initially wanted results inform of resource savings and 
better logistics after the implementation have not been encountered for. Regarding the safety 
benefits one of the leaders state; “In the beginning the implementation pressured recourses 
that affected the safety negatively, now the safety should be back where it was, maybe even 
better, at some points”. The nurses give different impressions in whether the safety level has 
been affected. Two of them have a negative impression about the new system; they both come 
from departments that were expected to experience difficulties when this system was 
implemented. Neither of them feels that the system has become well integrated in their work, 
and that the system is still an issue of concern regarding patient safety. The third nurse, 
however, claims that her department has benefited by the system and that it has increased the 
patient safety there. The other leader express that; “In the balance of how it affect our safety 
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we need to consider the complexity of the system and the healthcare providers’ ability to 
utilise the new tool in a safe manner, so there are always a chance of a downside. But we do 
not have any clear answer to whether it has affected our safety.” Based on the information 
from the nurses, however, it can be assumed that in some departments the system has in fact 
had a positive effect on the patient safety. Though, in other departments the negative 
consequences of the new system might ultimately have decreased the safety. They all seem to 
agree that it was a system change that had to happen at some point. Though, the leaders argue 
that it cost to be early adopters. “The smart ones wait and let others do the implementation 
and the experiences, so that the system is improved before one self make use of it, so you 
avoid all the beginners mistakes.” There were clearly risks involved with the previous system, 
though new risks have evolved trough pressuring resources in some parts of the hospital. At 
this time the hospital is using three different systems for the same job in different divisions. 
This lack of standardising, as well as neither the improved logistic nor the saving of resources 
may have caused the implementation of the new system to bring more challenges than 
benefits. As one of the leaders confirm; when innovative systems are evaluated only the 
benefits are considered; “The risk and that every new system needs further development and 
that one use more resources in a period of transition are not accounted for.” So when they 
chose the system, they had not really gasped the ultimate consequences of the implementation.  
In the offshore company there has mainly been positive experience with process innovations. 
The leaders believe there has been a great safety benefit by implementing the system in 
question. The organizational members in general agrees in this statement, and express that 
though the day to day safety of their operations has not been very affected, the overall safety 
situation at the production sites has been improved. One of the offshore workers, however, 
does not have the impression that the new systems she has seen be implemented have had any 
significant improvement on the safety level. Though, it has not caused any deterioration in the 
safety level either. It seems that because of the required and detailed testing and good training 
of employees the offshore company does not experience the initial decline in safety when they 
implement new innovations. The operators are qualified in utilising the new tools and the 
tools have been tested and modified to remove enough of the beginner faults before they are 
implemented to ensure stable safety levels also during implementation of innovation.  
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5.2.4. Discussion on Innovation Adoption 
The sections above are indented to present the responds from the interviews to describe the 
innovation adoption process, factors of a successful implementation and how innovations are 
affecting safety within the units of analysis. This section, like the discussion section for Safety 
Culture and Regulations, compiles the main highlights that appear in the interviews and 
synthesise the empirical evidences in the light of the research propositions 2, 3 and 4 given in 
the Research Design chapter. 
Proposition 2 suggests that; “Leadership interest and involvement positively affects the safety 
culture and innovation adoption processes within the offshore and healthcare industries in 
Norway.”  Under the Safety Culture and Regulations discussion this proposition was found to 
be supported in regards to leadership involvement’s affect on safety culture. In this section 
this proposition is seen in the light of innovation adoption processes. Here the overall 
impression of managerial involvement in the implementation of innovation in form of 
planning, training and visibility were considered. Here it was of interest to take into 
considerations the organisations’ success in leading their organisational members through the 
innovation adoption process by Rogers (1983) as elaborated in the Literature Review chapter.   
From the empirical data both of the organisations’ members have corresponding impressions 
of what are important factors to accomplish a successful innovation adoption process. The 
factors that are focused upon are; high quality of the new system, that it is user-friendly and 
that employees clearly see the added values of the new system; sufficient training and 
information about the system, to allow employees to feel confident in operating the new 
system and that a positive attitude is created among employees; and a good and safe 
implementation strategy, that does not cause increased risk and safety issues. All these factors 
are directly associated to management involvement in the innovation adoption process. 
Management is responsible for adequate testing before implementation of a new system to 
assure of quality and stable safety levels during implementation. They are the source to 
information and are responsible to make organisational members trust in their decision to 
create a positive attitude among the organisational members. Additionally they decide on how 
and what training employees are to receive and that the implementation process is completed 
in a good and safe mode.  
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Based on these findings it can be implied that also for innovation adoption processes 
leadership interest and involvement is of great importance. Managerial engagement in the 
adoption process does appear to be very essential to an innovation implementation, and does 
positively affect organisational members’ adoption process. By this empirical evidence 
proposition 2 is proven true in the unit of analysis.  
In proposition 3 it is assumed that; “It is a more positive environment for innovation adoption 
in the offshore industry than what is found in the healthcare sector.” To study this proposition 
the empirical data was analysed based on Rogers and Shoemaker’s (1971) three features 
important for successful adoption; compatibility, relative advantage and complexity, as 
defined in the Literature Review chapter.  
The hospital has had some previous experience with implementing systems that were not well 
enough adapted to the work environments where they were to be utilised, causing personnel to 
face compatibility issues such as initial bad attitudes towards innovation because of previous 
negative experience with new systems, and that they are assuming that a new system will not 
cover the needs of their work environment. They also seem to feel considered about relative 
advantage, as they have experienced that new systems might have offered some new features, 
though have not offered all the benefits of previous systems. The complexity is also 
considered as a greater issue within the hospital when compared to the offshore company. In 
the offshore company operators express that they are used to applying new systems and 
technology, this gives them a familiarity of how to understand and utilise new systems. The 
hospital, however, appears to not have implemented sufficient numbers of systems for the 
staffs to feel comfortable in their use of new technology. Additionally, as it was enlighten in 
the empirical data collected from the offshore organisation, the oil and gas industry mainly 
consist of individuals with technological training and understanding. An individual who holds 
technological educations tends to have a personal interest in technology and therefore can be 
assumed to have an initial positive attitude when confronted with new technologies. The 
healthcare providers does not benefit from this technological background and can therefore be 
assumed to have a certain degree of resistance when having to learn new complex system 
innovations.  
Based on this data it can be argued that it is a more positive environment for innovation 
adoption in the offshore industry in comparison with the healthcare sector. Proposition 3 is 
therefore supported in the light of the environments identified within the units of analysis.  
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Finally the proposition 4 propose that; “Innovation increases the safety levels in the offshore 
and healthcare sector.” As it was argued in literature innovation is essential for organisational 
advancement. System innovations are claimed to have been a major factor positively affecting 
the safety levels within the offshore industry, and it was therefore assumed that innovation 
does in fact have an positive affect on safety in the to units of analysis. To assess this 
organisational members and leaders impression of increased safety after implementation of 
process innovations was considered, though no numerical evidences was collected to defend 
this proposition.  
The two organisations demonstrate some differences in their managerial involvement towards 
reaching a successful innovation adoption process. In the offshore company there is a greater 
focus on pretesting of new system to ensure high quality before implementation is started. The 
employees have not experienced a decreased safety during implementation, suggesting that 
the quality of the new systems implemented and the training and information they have 
received has been sufficient. Though, there are certain differences in the perceptions of 
whether and how much safety levels are in fact increased after innovative systems are utilised. 
Generally they have an impression that safety levels are positively affected by the process 
innovations, as illustrated in Figure 5. 
  
Figure 5. Illustration of the interviewees from the offshore company’s 
general perception of process innovations’ effect on safety levels. 
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In the healthcare organisation, however, all interviewees confirm an initial drop in safety 
levels after the implementation of a new system. The perceptions among organisational 
members of the evolving of safety levels after this decline is though very separated. Some 
members indicate that safety levels stay at a lower level than prior to the implementation, 
others feel they go back to the safety level before implementation of the new system, while 
some claim that the safety levels are ultimately increased. This is illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Illustration of the interviewees from the hospital’s different  
perceptions of process innovations’ effect on safety levels. 
 
Based on the empirical data collected in this research alone it cannot be suggested that 
innovation does advance safety levels within the offshore and healthcare organisations studied, 
so Proposition 4 is not truly supported. However, the researcher does suggest that the effect of 
process innovation has the ability to positively affect safety levels. Though, this is strongly 
dependent on a well qualified new system being successfully adopted by organisational 
members through a systematic and good implementation process. 
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6.  Conclusions 
In this final chapter proposition findings and additional findings leading to potential 
managerial implications were presented in short. At the very end of this academic work and 
finally the research question of this study were reflected upon, and safety culture was 
compared and linked to innovation adoption processes. 
6.1. Findings and Managerial Implications 
In the sections presented above the empirical findings were discussed in the light of the 
propositions proposed in the Research Design chapter. It was found that the offshore 
organisation did not have a clearly better and more advanced safety culture compared to the 
healthcare organisation studied. Leadership interest and involvement were identified to be of 
great importance when considering the safety culture and innovation adoption process within 
the units of analysis. Additionally, it was found that there is a more positive environment 
towards innovation adoption processes within the offshore organisation in comparison with 
the healthcare organisation. Finally, innovation could not be proved to increase the safety 
levels in neither of the organisations, though the empirical data suggested that with a 
successful adaptation process innovation could be claimed to improve safety levels.  
Some additional findings of interest have been identified throughout this exploratory case 
study; 
Firstly, in the hospital analysed it appears that some personnel do feel concerned by the lack 
of anonymity in the reporting tool used for reporting unwanted events and near-misses. 
However, as confirmed by the leaders this tool is not meant for the reporting of individuals by 
name. The tool is intended to identify the root cause of the reported events for the 
organisation to learn and advance its safety measures. Therefore, the hospital as a learning 
organisation would possibly benefit from making it clearer for employees that reporting is not 
meant to blame individuals, though to point out issues of concern to allow learning.  
Secondly, an interesting observation was made when studying the system innovation 
implementation process in the hospital. The leaders claim that the implementation process 
was to be stopped if the system did not offer the benefits that were promised. However, the 
implementation process was planned in a manner that the departments who were considered 
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to face the least challenges with the new system, based on their local environment, were to be 
the first-users. This strategy can be questioned, as they then first will identify the major issues 
with a new system fare out in the implementation process. At that point the amount of 
invested recourses will be so considerable that stopping the process will be a costly and 
difficult choice to make. Therefore it would be suggested that for future process innovations 
this strategy is reconsidered. The researcher suggests that it could be beneficial if the 
departments expected to experience the greatest challenges with a new process innovation 
were included in the first-user group. In this way weaknesses and faults with the new system 
could be identified at an earlier stage of the implementation process, and it would be easier to 
consider alternative solutions.  
A third observation is that personnel in neither of the organisations are much engaged in the 
planning and decisions on new process innovations. It is the management responsibility to 
inform and involve employees in their innovation discussions in order to deliver innovations 
that are actually needed. Both organisations could potentially benefit from investigating the 
needs of their employees, both in the process of identifying requests of beneficial areas to 
consider new and innovative processes, as well as in the process of pretesting new systems to 
ensure user-friendliness and work environmental adaptations of new process innovations. This 
could potentially have a great effect on the innovation adoption process and the attitudes 
among employees in regards to new technology. 
Finally, linking to the third observation, several of the interviewees conversed with for this 
research had interesting thought regarding process innovations intended for healthcare 
organisations. From the offshore organisation it was suggested that the hospital could benefit 
from an IT-system that allowed every organisational member to access the real-time safety 
and quality situation within each department and on all medical equipment located within a 
hospital. A tool that offered to illustrate progression or decline in safety levels, visualise the 
causes of such changes and identify the measures that would give the greatest safety benefits 
and should receive the first priority. From the hospital a similar IT-system was suggested. 
Here the need of a system that could visualise the real-time patient flow in all departments 
within a hospital was expressed. This was assumed to offer benefits at times when a hospital 
has increased numbers of patients, reaching towards its capacity, and when resources are 
pressured. In such situations the suggested tool would visualise where there still is capacity 
receive more patients within a hospital to, and immediately identify the patients that needs to 
be transferred to another facility. The researcher envisages an IT-system that combines these 
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two tools in one tool that offers an overview of the real-time situation in a healthcare 
organisation. Although this is not directly a managerial implementation, it might propose to 
conduct more investigation of the need of such a system, and possibly to a request for a tool to 
be developed.  
6.2. Final Conclusion  
In this final conclusion of the findings the main research question was examined; “How does 
the cultural attitude towards risk and safety in the Norwegian offshore industry and healthcare 
sector affect their innovation adoption processes?” When answering this question the first 
inquiry to clarify was whether an organisations’ safety culture do indeed affect the innovation 
adoption process among its organisational members. Innovation adoption is claimed by 
Rogers (1983) to be a process of five stages; awareness, persuasion, decision, implementation, 
and confirmation, all defined in the literature chapter. These stages can in many ways be 
argued to describe the way individuals also adapt to safety measures; which in the end 
becomes an organisation’s safety culture. Individuals first get aware of the safety issue, then 
receive information and training to minimise the risk of an unwanted event to happen. 
Following this they make up their personal opinion on whether they should be concerned 
about the safety issue, and how to behave to handle or ignore the issue. When they have seen 
the consequences of their behaviour they choose whether to continue their behaviour or 
whether to change their modes of action. Therefore, the same stages of action as the ones 
assuring a successful innovation adoption process will be required by an organisation in order 
to advance their safety culture; make the organisational members aware of the safety situation, 
inform and train the individuals towards understanding and handling the risks. If this training 
is sufficient and people feel the behaviour suggested by management is in fact increasing 
safety they accept the measures and the organisational safety culture can advance. This 
suggests that an organisation that is good at advancing safety culture will also feature the 
capabilities to accomplish successful innovation adoption processes.   
Additionally, there are clearly many of the same factors needed to advance a safety culture as 
the ones needed to thrive in accomplishing a successful innovation adoption by an 
organisation. Major organisational features that are found to be important for both an 
advanced safety culture and a successful innovation adaptation process are; informed 
organisational members who have, through training and managerial supervision, understood 
the importance and added value of the innovation/the increased safety; and organisational 
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trust and openness, where employees trust in managerial decisions, and where management is 
interested in understanding the needs of their employees and listen to feedback from their 
employees to increase the benefit of new systems. It could therefore be suggested that an 
organisation that has achieved an advanced safety culture maturity will have the right attitudes 
among their organisational members to have an advantage in the meeting with new 
technology. The openness, trust, and confidence in managerial decisions, which an ideal 
organisational safety culture has, will ultimately offer a greater chance of accomplishing a 
successful innovation adaptation process. However, this does not mean that adoption process 
will go effortlessly. Clearly every innovation implemented needs a well thought through 
testing, informing, training and implementation process, though the advantage of having 
organisational members who believe the management makes the right decisions, take 
responsibility and listen, is of course an advantage. To conclude, the safety culture in it self 
might not be the important factor of successful innovation adoption process, it is the features 
of the safety culture that can positively affect an organisational innovation adoption process 
through out all the steps of the process.  
Before this study was commenced some ethical considerations arose from the fact that the 
topics in focus; safety culture and acceptance of innovation, are psychologically difficult 
topics to discuss. Throughout the data collection process the researcher sensed that some 
interviewees gave the impression to not include all difficult details. It is impossible for the 
researcher to determine whether such concealments have indeed occurred, though this needs 
to be taken into consideration when assessing the data. The data that may have suffered from 
this suppression of information are particularly the evidence considered in Proposition 1 and 4. 
Neither of the two propositions was therefore concluded upon and further research and 
empirical data is required to conclude on the safety levels within the two industries in Norway 
as well as how innovation affects their safety levels. It has to be declared that the only way to 
fully understand an organisation is to be part of it. As an external observer a researcher can 
never to a full extent gasp its nature, though through interacting with individuals who are part 
of the organisational culture the observer can achieve a partially comprehension of its 
character.  
Finally, this exploratory case study research only took into consideration two units of analysis 
and was basing its conclusions on the opinions of only thirteen interview objects. It is 
therefore of great importance to beware the difference between their internal and external 
validity (Yin 2003, Wilson 2010). Since this study has been performed in two single cases, 
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only including a marginal number of their organizational members, the results cannot, 
exclusive of further supportive research, be generalised to anticipate attitudes and behaviour 
within the two units of analysis, nor within other organisations and industries. In other words, 
the conclusions are backed by empirical evidences that offer only validity within the 
boundaries of the informants questioned for this research. Therefore no normative conclusion 
can be drawn from this study about the relationship between safety culture and innovation 
adoption in general. Nevertheless this study contributes with initial empirical evidences and 
case-specific conclusions that suggest the existence of a relation between the two phenomena 
that may propose to further research on this topic.   
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APPENDIX – INTERVIEW BACKBONE 
Interviews with organisational leaders:  
 
Safety culture questions: 
 Can you tell me about your background and what your role is in this organisation?  
 How would you define an ideal safety culture? 
 How would you compare the safety culture you described with the safety culture you 
have in this organisation?  
 How do you ensure safety in this organisation?  
o Are there leaders with particular responsibility to ensure safety?  
o Is there external parties controlling your safety? 
 What training and supervision do organisational members receive in regards to risk 
and safety? 
o What are the goals of this training?  
o How often is it repeated? 
 Do you think it is easy for organisational members to talk about safety related topics 
and own mistakes with their leaders? 
 Do you have a system for report incidents or accidents?  
o How does the reporting system work?  
o What types of events are to be reported?  
o How do employees feel about and utilise the system? 
 If an employee sees a potential threat to the safety, how would they, and would they 
communicate this to the management? 
 Would there be different consequences for an employee who reported his/her own 
mistakes compared to if someone else reported the mistakes?    
 Are there any standard operating procedures when an accident happens?  
o What are they or how do they work in such situations? 
o What measures are done to assure that the situation will not happen again?  
 Have you experience situations where there is a conflict between prioritising safety 
and other important goals?  
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 What do you consider to be the greatest challenges for this organisation to achieve 
high levels of safety? 
Innovation adoption questions: 
 Did you work here when the system in question was implemented?  
o How long did you work here before the implementation of the new technology?  
 Who made the decision that this system was to be implemented?  
 Why do you think this new system was implemented?  
 Do you believe that employees understood the need and the value of the new system? 
 How did you feel about the implementation process?  
 Has the system been well integrated in the daily process in the organisation? 
 What feedback have you received from organisational members about the system? 
o What are the strengths and weaknesses with the new system?  
 How did management assure that personnel saw the value of the new tool? 
 Do you believe things could have been done differently during the implementation in 
order for the organisational members to have a better attitude towards the new system? 
 Do you feel this system has improved the level of safety?  
 Which factor do you consider important for creating a positive attitude among 
organisational member towards a new system or tool?  
 Do you have any additional comments? 
 
Interviews with organisational employees:  
 
Safety culture questions: 
 Can you tell me about your background and what your role is in this organisation?  
 How would you define an ideal safety culture? 
 How would you compare the safety culture you described with the safety culture you 
have in this organisation?  
 How do you ensure safety in your daily work? 
 How would you characterise the hospital management commitment and engagement 
in safety? 
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 Do you feel that safety rules and procedures in some situations become barrier for you 
to doing your job efficiently?  
 How is safety controlled her in your department? 
 When was the last time you had safety training, or were reminded about safety issues 
by your manager/supervisor?  
o Did you have risk and safety training when you first started your job? If not, 
why do you think that is and do you think it could be important? If yes, what 
kind of training?  
o  How are your safety skills gained from the training maintained? 
 Do you think it is easy to talk about safety concerns and issues with your leader? 
 Do you know if you have a system to report incidents or accidents?  
o How does the reporting system work?  
o What kind of event do you report?   
o When was the last time that you reported an issue, what was this about?  
o Do you feel the reporting system works?  
o Do you think everyone use it actively?  
o Do you think some issues are hard to admit for some employees?  
o Do you think that all your co-workers understand the importance of safety and 
reporting safety issues? 
 Have you noticed any improvements after you or others reported an issue?  
 If an employee sees a potential threat to the safety, how would they communicate this 
to the management? 
 Have you experienced any accidents or near-misses?  
 Are there any standard operating procedures when an accident happens? What are they 
or how do they work in such situations? 
 Have you seen changes after an accident or near-miss situation to prevent it from 
happening again?   
 Have you experience situations where there is a conflict between prioritising safety 
and other important goals?  
 What do you consider to be the greatest challenges for this organisation to achieve 
high levels of safety? 
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Innovation adoption questions: 
 Did you work here when the system in question was implemented?  
o How long did you work here before the implementation of the new technology?  
 Who made the decision that this system was to be implemented?  
 Why do you think this new system was implemented?  
 How did you feel about the implementation process?  
 Has the system been well integrated in your daily work?  
 Do you feel comfortable with the system? 
 What do you like/dislike about it?  
 Do you think your colleagues find the new system beneficial and user-friendly?  
 How were you trained in the use of the system?  
 Were the benefits of the new system clear for you before you started to use it? 
o Do you still think it offered benefits? 
 Do you believe things could have been done differently during the implementation in 
order for you and your co-workers to understand and use the system more efficiently?  
 Do you feel this system has improved the level of safety?  
 Which factor do you consider important for creating a positive attitude among 
organisational member towards a new system or tool?  
 Do you have any additional comments? 
 
 
